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Abstract
The federal government devotes over a trillion dollars each year to tax provisions that
pursue “nontax” goals. Scaling back these tax expenditures should be a high priority. Yet onesize-fits-all limits are often proposed, and are not good policy. Each tax expenditure generates
its own mix of positive externalities and private benefits (or “programmatic benefits”). To
choose the right limit, we should consider what programmatic benefits we would lose. The goal
should be to reap programmatic benefits at lower cost. Different strategies are appropriate for
each tax expenditure, including: tightening the definition of favored conduct; focusing on
claimants who are easiest to motivate; favoring claimants who use the subsidy more effectively;
calibrating how much favored activity we subsidize; and changing the government agency that
administers the subsidy. We also should account for excess burden and distribution. Does
repeal or a limit influence labor or savings decisions? Does it affect planning and
administrative costs? Does it bring is closer to the distribution we want?
In addition to proposing this three-part framework for limiting tax expenditures, which
focuses on programmatic benefits, excess burden, and distribution, this Article also analyzes
seven different limits. They have very different effects. For example, a “cap” eliminates the
subsidy for high levels of favored activity. In contrast, a “floor” disallows the subsidy for low
levels. “Haircuts,” “maximum fractions,” and “phaseouts” preserve the subsidy for both high
and low levels of favored activity, but in weakened form. Each limit offers a different mix of
strengths and weaknesses, making it a better fit for some tax expenditures than others.
Like limits, tax expenditures also vary in systematic ways. This Article identifies an
important distinction among them. For some tax expenditures, marginal benefits vary only with
the activity level of all claimants in the aggregate; for others, marginal benefits also vary with
the activity level of each claimant. When we subsidize green energy, for instance, the aggregate
is our main concern; the goal is to replace as much carbon-based energy as possible, and it
matters less who is doing so (as long as they do it well enough). In contrast, when we subsidize
health insurance, we care a lot about how much insurance each individual has. The difference
between what this Article calls “aggregate” subsidies (like green energy) and “individuallybased” subsidies (like health insurance) can influence the type of limit we want. For example,
caps are likely to be a better fit for individually-based subsidies than aggregate ones, since we
care more about how much each claimant claims.
This Article also makes a number of other recommendations, including: first, the subsidy
rate often should vary for different tax expenditures; second, instead of using “basket limits”
that govern a group of tax expenditures, we should tailor a separate limit for each one; and
third, the subsidy rate often should vary with income.
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The federal government devotes over a trillion dollars each year to tax provisions that
pursue “nontax” goals, such as the deduction for mortgage interest and the exclusion for
employer-provided health insurance. 2 Scaling back these “tax expenditures”3 should be a high
priority, as many commentators and presidential commissions have urged.4 Yet too often, the
same limit is used for a broad range of tax expenditures. In the 2013 budget deal, for instance,
Congress revived a uniform limit on itemized deductions called the “Pease rule.”5 In 2012, both
presidential candidates proposed their own one-size-fits-all limit.6 In the same year, the United
Kingdom imposed a single cap on all personal deductions.7 Likewise, the Bowles Simpson
Commission,8 Martin Feldstein,9 Edward Kleinbard,10 and other distinguished commentators

2

William McBride, A Brief History of Tax Expenditures, FISCAL FACT, Aug. 22, 2013, at 1,
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff391.pdf (Treasury estimates tax expenditures budget is
$1.2 trillion, with joint committee at $1.3 trillion, representing 96% growth since 1991); James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle
D. Logue, Understanding the AMT, and Its Unadopted Sibling, the AMxT, University of Mich. Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 78 (Aug. 2013), at 8 n. 27 (describing tax expenditure budget as “readily available (if flawed)
measure of federal tax preferences”), http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/78/.
3
Congress defines tax expenditures as tax provisions that "allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction . . . or
. . . a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2006). They are “analogous to direct outlay programs, and the two can be
considered as alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy objectives." STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, PUB. NO. JCX-15-11, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TAX EXPENDITURE
ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES 2 (2011), available at
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func-startdown&id=3740. This Article defers to Congress’s definition,
instead of entering the traditional debate about which provisions are “special” enough to be tax expenditures. See,
e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal Tax Subsidies in the National Budget, 22 NAT. TAX J. 244, 258 (1969).
The focus here is not on their conceptual compatibility with a particular tax base, but on the welfare effects of
repealing or limiting them.
4
See infra Part I.B.
5
Section 68. All references to specific sections of the Internal Revenue Code in this Article cite to 26 U.S.C. (1986)
as amended. See also Frank Armstrong III, Pease Limitation Puts a Lid on Itemized Deductions for

Wealthy Folks, FORBES, Jan. 9, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/01/09/peaselimitation-puts-a-lid-on-itemized-deductions-for-wealthy-folks/.
6

See supra note 4.
The cap is the greater of 50,000 pounds or 25% of income. It was introduced in the 2012 budget. See HM
Treasury, A Fairer, More Efficient and Simpler Tax System, Mar. 12, 2012,
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/budget2012_fair_efficient_tax.htm
8
See, e.g., The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth (2010),
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf.
(using “zero base budgeting” to eliminate all tax expenditures);
9 Martin Feldstein, Daniel Feenberg, Maya MacGuineas, Capping Individual Tax Expenditure Benefits, NBER
Working Paper 16921 (April 2011) (advocating overall cap on all itemized deductions, as well as some other tax
expenditures, so that the tax benefit does not exceed 2% of AGI), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16921.
10
EDWARD KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEND OUR
MONEY 383 (2014) (proposing to replace all personal itemized deduction with a 15% credit and noting that “[t]he
reason to curb all the personal itemized deductions is that it is impossible to choose among them. Each can be
defended as an incentive for one desirable goal or another”).
7
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have all recommended their own version of uniform treatment.11 Yet although one-size-fits-all
answers may be good politics, they are not good policy. What makes sense for the earned
income tax credit is unlikely to work for green energy or charity.
After all, each tax expenditure encourages different behavior, generating its own mix of
positive externalities and private benefits (or “programmatic benefits”). In deciding whether to
scale back a tax expenditure – or, indeed, any government program – we need to consider the
programmatic benefits we would lose. If it generates only meager programmatic benefits, we
have good reason to scale it back. Even if these benefits are significant, reaping them at lower
cost is desirable. This Article canvasses five different strategies for doing so: tightening the
definition of favored conduct; focusing on claimants who are easiest to motivate; favoring
claimants who use the subsidy more effectively; calibrating how much favored activity we
subsidize; and changing the government agency that administers the subsidy. The right strategy
depends on the relevant externalities, elasticities, and other context-specific factors.
In addition to the nontax policy goal, we also need to account for the traditional grist of
tax policy: excess burden and distribution. Does repeal or a limit influence labor or savings
decisions? Does it affect planning and administrative costs? For example, most limits can push
claimants into a higher tax bracket, and some also alter the effective marginal tax rate in other
ways. Does repeal or a limit bring us closer to the distribution we want? Some tax expenditures
focus especially on low-income people, creating externalities or offering tax benefits that
disproportionately benefit them. Yet others do not. Indeed, since low- and middle-income
taxpayers are taxed at much lower rates than thirty years ago, many tax expenditures offer them a
correspondingly reduced tax benefit.12 A lot of the relevant effects on excess burden and
distribution are not unique to tax expenditures, and would arise in scaling back any government
program (such as the distributional impact of externalities). Yet some issues arise because these
measures are in the tax code (such as effects on a claimant’s tax bracket). Given the broad swath
of relevant issues, the analysis is too complex and multifaceted for one-size-fits-all answers.
Instead, this Article offers a three-part framework for limiting tax expenditures, focusing on
programmatic benefits, excess burden, and distribution.
This Article also analyzes seven different limits. Obviously, each one helps the
government raise more revenue, and also adds complexity to the tax system. In addition, each
limit raises the after-tax cost of favored activity, and shifts some claimants to a higher tax
bracket. But otherwise, these limits have very different effects. A “cap” eliminates the subsidy
for high levels of favored activity. A “fixed dollar” cap defines this boundary as a specified
amount (e.g., retirement savings above $15,000 per year), while an “income based” cap defines it
as a percentage of income (a charitable contributions above 50% of adjusted gross income). In
contrast, a “floor” disallows the subsidy for low levels of favored activity. Again, there are
fixed-dollar floors (e.g., disallowing charitable contributions below $500) and income-based
11

Lily Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable
Tax Credits, 59 STANFORD L. REV. 23 (2006) (arguing that the most efficient default structure for tax expenditures is
a uniform refundable credit, so that low-income and high-income taxpayers receive the same marginal
reimbursement rate); Neil Warren, A Politically Viable Strategy for Limiting Personal Income Tax Deductions: The
Case for a Global Cap, 29 Aus. Tax Forum 357, 359 (2014) (favoring “the UK approach where the focus is on
global caps rather than imposing specific caps on a myriad of individual itemized deductions”).
12
Eric M. Zolt, Inequality in America: Challenges for Tax and Spending Policy, 66 TAX L. REV. 1101 (2013).
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floors (e.g., disallowing charitable contributions below 1% of adjusted gross income). Other
limits preserve the subsidy for both high and low levels of favored activity, but in weakened
form: a “haircut” disallows a fixed percentage of a deduction or exclusion (e.g., 50% of travel
and entertainment expenses); a “maximum fraction” limits the tax benefit to a fixed percentage
(e.g., capping the tax benefit from the charitable deduction to 28%, even for those in higher tax
brackets); and a “phaseout” reduces the tax benefit for high income claimants. Just as these
various limits have diverse effects on programmatic benefits, they also influence excess burden
and distribution in different ways. Some limits increase the effective marginal tax rate (e.g.,
phaseouts and income-based floors), while others decrease it (e.g., income-based caps). Some
encourage claimants to concentrate favored activity into a single tax year (e.g., floors), and
others motivate them to spread it across multiple years (e.g., caps). Some limits especially
reduce the subsidy for high-income claimants (e.g., phaseouts, fixed-dollar caps, haircuts, and
maximum fractions), while others do not (e.g., income-based floors, fixed-dollar floors, and
income-based caps). As a result, each limit has a different mix of strengths and weaknesses,
making it a better fit in some contexts than others.
Like limits, tax expenditures also vary in systematic ways. This Article identifies an
important distinction among them. For some tax expenditures, marginal benefits vary only with
the activity level of all claimants in the aggregate; for others, marginal benefits also vary with
the activity level of each claimant. When we subsidize green energy, for instance, the aggregate
is our main concern; the goal is to replace as much carbon-based energy as possible, and it
matters less who is doing so (as long as they do it well enough). In contrast, when we subsidize
health insurance, we care a lot about how much insurance each individual has. The difference
between what this Article calls “aggregate” subsidies (like green energy) and “individuallybased” subsidies (like health insurance) can influence the type of limit we want.
For example, caps are likely to be a better fit for individually-based subsidies than
aggregate ones, since we care more about how much each claimant claims. In deciding whether
to impose a cap, we should ask what happens when individual claimants engage in more favored
activity. Do the marginal programmatic benefits decline? If they do, encouraging more activity
stops being cost effective at a certain point. For example, what if a basic health insurance policy
creates positive externalities, but a more expensive “gold plated” one does not add more? If this
is the case, we should subsidize only basic policies. Capping the subsidy saves money while
preserving programmatic benefits. A further advantage is that, unlike other limits, a cap does not
disallow more deductions as claimants earn more. By not increasing a claimant’s effective
marginal rate in this way, a cap adds less to excess burden. A cap also can improve distribution,
since high-income taxpayers are more likely to buy gold-plated policies. As long as the marginal
benefits from health insurance subsidies decline in this way, then, a cap can advance all our
goals. But we do not get the same “grand slam” in capping a green energy subsidy, since
marginal externalities do not decline in the same way. After all, installing one solar panel on
every roof is no better than two on every other roof. Either way, we replace the same amount of
carbon-based energy.
While capping health insurance could advance all our goals, it is more typical for
tradeoffs to arise. Each limit offers a different mix of tradeoffs, which is a better fit for some
subsidies than others. For example, income-based floors involve a tradeoff between
programmatic benefits and excess burden. They avoid subsidizing the first dollar of favored
5

activity, which is helpful if the targeted group would engage in this activity anyway. At the
same time, though, they increase the claimant’s effective marginal tax rate by disallowing more
deductions as claimants earn more. A similar tradeoff arises with phaseouts. There are
programmatic advantages in excluding high-income claimants, since they need less help and are
more likely to engage in the favored activity anyway. But phaseouts also increase the effective
tax rate. Whether a floor or phaseout makes sense in a particular context depends on the
empirical magnitude of these (and other) competing effects. The answer varies for different
subsidies. For example, a floor is a poor fit when the goal is to persuade claimants to do what
they are not already doing (e.g., joining the work force), but a good fit when the goal is to
encourage more of what they are already doing (e.g., charity).
Because empirics feature so prominently in this analysis, this Article makes only
tentative suggestions about individual tax expenditures. No definitive recommendations are
offered, since the necessary empirical assessments are beyond this Article’s scope. Even so, the
importance of empirics and context has four further implications. First, the subsidy rate, which
this Article calls the “marginal reimbursement rate,”13 often should vary for different tax
expenditures. Instead of using the marginal tax rate, as we do for deductions and exclusions
under current law, we should rely on context-specific assessments of externalities and elasticity.
Second, we should tailor a separate limit for each tax expenditure. For instance, instead of
imposing a $25,000 cap on all itemized deductions, as Governor Romney proposed, we should
use a separate limit for each. Third, empirical research on these issues has obvious value. The
Treasury should consider investing more in this research, as well as sharing more data. Fourth,
the marginal reimbursement rate often should vary with income, notwithstanding the contrary
recommendation of Lily Batchelder, Fred Goldberg, and Peter Orszag.14
Needless to say, none of this is easy. Two problems loom especially large in reforming
tax expenditures. First, many of the relevant empirical questions are quite difficult to resolve.
There is only limited empirical work on these issues. Indeed, there is a great deal of uncertainty
(and debate) about the magnitude of relevant externalities, elasticities, labor and savings
distortions, and administrative costs. The impact of many tax expenditures on distribution is also
contested. Yet empirical uncertainty is a perennial challenge in tax policy (and, indeed, in life).
If we refuse to make policy changes without full information, we (tacitly) commit to the status
quo. This is itself a decision based on imperfect information. Instead, we should do what we
can with the limited information we have. While this path is not always satisfying, it is the best
we can do.
Second, the political hurdles are quite daunting. Obviously, each tax expenditure draws
support from a range of interest groups. Real estate developers, contractors, and mortgage
lenders defend the mortgage interest deduction, while religious organizations, universities, and
museums support the charitable deduction, and so on. Overcoming this opposition is especially
difficult in a climate of partisan deadlock. Even so, any effort to reduce the deficit has to
disappoint someone. Compared with the alternatives, limits on tax expenditures have a notable
political advantage. Because they are complicated, limits are less salient to voters.15 For
13

This term was coined by Dan Shaviro. Daniel N. Shaviro, Fixing U.S. International Taxation (2014).
Batchelder, Goldberg Orszag, supra note 8.
15
See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. REG. 253, 296 (2011); Brian
Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2009-2010).
14
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example, we can increase effective marginal rates not only by raising the stated rate, but also by
disallowing more deductions as taxpayers earn more. The Pease rule uses this sort of incomebased floor. Although economically comparable to a rate increase, the Pease rule is less visible
to unsophisticated taxpayers. Limits also can have a further political advantage: if they enhance
welfare, those who benefit usually become political supporters. While this support is not always
sufficient, it can carry the day in some cases. In any event, political challenges should not keep
us from considering how to reform tax expenditures. After all, we need to know where we want
to go, even if it is hard to get there.
In developing a three-part framework, analyzing different limits, and identifying
tradeoffs, this Article focuses more on institutional design than does the public finance literature
on optimal tax and externalities.16 At the same time, this Article offers more general
observations and prescriptions than does the vast literature on specific tax expenditures, which
includes work on the employer-provided health insurance exclusion,17 mortgage interest
deduction,18 state and local tax deduction,19 earned income-tax credit,20 charitable deduction,21
Pease Rule,22 alternative minimum tax,23 Romney cap, and the alternative tax proposed by
16

See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT.
TAX J. 513 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation, NBER
Working Paper 12339 (2006); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Integrating Expenditure and Tax Decisions: The
Marginal Cost of Funds and the Marginal Benefit of Projects, 54 NAT. TAX J. 189 (2001). Agnar Sandmo, Optimal
Taxation in the Presence of Externalities, 77 SWEDISH J. ECON.86 (1975) (incorporating externalities in an optimal
tax framework and showing that usual commodity taxes based on elasticity must be coupled with taxes and subsidies
targeting externalities); Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari & Norbert Ladoux, Externalities and Optimal Taxation, 70
J. PUB. ECON. 343 (1998) (noting that optimal mix of Pigouvian and income taxes depends on degree and type of
information available, so that Sandmo’s additivity principle may not always apply); Emmanuel Saez, The Optimal
Treatment of Tax Expenditures, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2657 (2004); Jukka Pirttila and Ronnie Schob, Redistribution and
Internalization: The Many-Person Ramsey Rule Revisited, 27 PUB. FIN. REV. 541, 554; Yew-Kwang Ng, The
Optimal Size of Public Spending and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 53 NAT. TAX J. 253 (2000) (arguing that
incentive effects of both the public spending and the accompanying tax must be considered, as well as their net
distributional effect); Peter Diamond, Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for Public Goods With and
Without Warm Glow Preferences, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 897 (2006).
17
See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, John Cogan, R. Glenn Hubbard & Daniel P. Kessler, Reforming the Tax Preference
for Employer Health Insurance, 26 TAX POLICY & ECON. 43; Jonathan Gruber, Taxes and Health Insurance, 16 TAX
POLICY & ECON. 37 (2002).
18
See, e.g., Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: How and Why the
Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. LAW 751 (2012); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The
Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 WTR LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBLS. 233 (2010); Roberta Mann, The (Not So Little) House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1347 (2000).
19
See, e.g., John William Hatfield, Revenue Decentralization, the Local Income Tax Deduction, and the Provision of
Public Goods, 66 NAT’L. TAX J. 97 (2013).
20
See, e.g., Anne Alstott, Why the Earned Income Tax Credit Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & SOC. PROBS. 285
(2010).
21
See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information and the Private
Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221 (2009) [hereinafter “Subsidizing Charitable Contributions”]; Louis
Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J PUB. ECON. 469 (1995).
22
Reed Shuldiner & David Shakow, Lessons From the Limitation on Itemized Deductions, TAX NOTES, Oct 29,
2001, at n.31 & accompanying text (showing that it increases effective marginal rates but does not affect the tax
savings from the marginal deduction).
23
Hines & Logue, supra note 3 (defending alternative minimum tax, while also proposing an alternative maximum
tax). Dan Shaviro has also invoked the AMT as evidence of congressional ambivalence about tax expenditures.
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Warren Buffett,24 as well as economic simulations of various proposals.25 Some other work also
operate at this intermediate level of generality. But this work often comes to different
conclusions, and considers only a subset of the issues addressed here,26 including the effect of
limits on marginal rates;27 the macroeconomic impact of tax expenditures;28 the nontax goals of
tax expenditures; 29 fairness;30 the nontransparent nature of these limits,31 and the advisability of
uniformity.32
While tax expenditures are a broad topic, they (and other subsidies) are merely a subset
of the policy instruments available to the government. For example, instead of subsidizing
favored behavior, the government can penalize disfavored behavior. Since these strategies are
mirror images, the analysis here can be relevant to Pigouvian taxes and other penalties, although
these connections are not the focus of this Article.33 Still another alternative – instead of carrots
Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality and Strategy: The New Alternative Minimum Tax, TAXES 91, 92 (1988)
(describing enactment of AMT as move from ambivalence to schizophrenia).
24
Daniel N. Shaviro, The Bucket and Buffett Approaches to Raising Taxes on High-Income Americans, NYU Law &
Economics Working Paper 12-44 (2013) (offering brief critique of two specific proposals: the Romney cap and the
Buffett minimum tax) [hereinafter “Bucket & Buffett”].
25
Eric Toder, Joseph Rosenberg & Amanda Eng, Evaluating Broad-Based Approaches to Limiting Tax
Expenditures, Tax Policy Center Working Paper, July 8, 2013,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412857-Evaluating-Broad-based-Approaches-for-Limiting-TaxExpenditures.pdf; Deena Ackerman & Gerald Auten, Floors, Ceilings and Opening the Door for a Non-Itemizer
Deduction, 59 NAT. TAX J. 509 (2006) (finding that extending charitable deductions to nonitemizers and adding a
floor, as suggested by President Bush’s 2005 tax reform commission, would lead to greater efficiency and more
contributions); Michael Schuyler, Feldstein Proposal Increases Federal Revenues But the Devil’s in the Details,
Apr. 30, 2013, http://taxfoundation.org/article/feldstein-proposal-increases-federal-revenues-devils-details.
26
For example, Professors Hines and Logue focus only on the tradeoff between progressivity and the “nontax”
policies pursued through tax expenditures, without incorporating excess burden into their analysis. Likewise, in his
short piece, Professor Shaviro focuses only on the Romney cap and the Buffett alternative tax and does not seek to
discuss the costs and benefits of various other limits and the tradeoffs they involve.
27
Elliott Manning and Laurence Andress show how limits on various tax expenditures influence effective marginal
rates; but they focus only on excess burden, and not programmatic incentives and distribution. Elliot Manning &
Laurence M. Andress, The 1996 Marginal Federal Income Tax Rates: The Image and the Reality, TAX NOTES, Dec.
30, 1996, at 1585. Martin Sullivan discusses different ways that caps influence effective marginal rates, but does
not discuss their effects on programmatic incentives and distribution, or the impact of other limits (such as floors or
fractions). Martin A. Sullivan, Deduction Caps Can Raise Marginal Rates, Cut Economic Growth, TAX NOTES,
Nov. 26, 2012, at 939.
28
Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency and Stability: the Importance of Macroeconomics for Evaluating Income Tax
Policy (2012), 29 YALE J. REG. 45 (2012) (analyzing macroeconomic impact of a number of tax expenditures).
29
Gregg Polsky proposes to analyze two types of tax expenditures differently in deciding whether to repeal them.
For distributional tax expenditures (which promote equity), he focuses on fairness; yet for allocative tax
expenditures (which encourage specific behavior), he focuses on what this Article calls “programmatic incentives.”
In contrast, this Article argues that both of these issues are relevant for all tax expenditures, as is excess burden,
which Professor Polsky does not discuss. His brief article also does not evaluate specific types of limits and the
tradeoffs they involve. Gregg D. Polsky, Rationally Cutting Tax Expenditures, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV., 643
(2011-12).
30
Id. (focusing on fairness for what he calls “distributional” tax expenditures).
31
See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. REG. 253, 296 (2011); Brian
Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2009-2010); Jacob Goldin & Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure
Salience, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2097836.
32
Batchelder, Goldberg Orszag, supra note 8.
33
Cf. Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2413066.
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and sticks – is for the government simply to require the behavior it wants or to prohibit what it
opposes. Since regulatory mandates are the subject of a robust literature, and involve a
somewhat different mix of costs and benefits, they are beyond this Article’s scope.
Part I surveys a spate of proposals using one-size-fits-all limits. Part II develops the
three-part framework and discusses five strategies for preserving programmatic benefits at lower
cost. Part III analyzes seven limits and the different tradeoffs they involve. Part IV identifies
two “grand slam” scenarios in which all our goals align. It also shows how context-specific
tailoring is needed to balance tradeoffs, and takes issue with Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag’s
view that tax expenditures usually should offer the same reimbursement rate at all income levels.
Part V is the conclusion.
I.

Revenue, Politics, and a Proliferation of One-Size-Fits-All Proposals
A. A Potentially Significant Source of Revenue

Repealing or limiting tax expenditures can raise a great deal of revenue. The federal
government committed $1.2 trillion to tax expenditures in Fiscal Year 2014,34 compared with
$3.5 trillion of direct spending and $3.03 trillion of taxes collected.35 Adjusted for inflation, tax
expenditures have nearly doubled since 1991.36 The largest tax expenditure, the exclusion for
employer-provided health insurance, was estimated at $143 billion in 2014.37 This is more than
the federal government spent on the Departments of Homeland Security ($39.0 billion),
Education ($71.2 billion), and Justice ($16.3 billion) combined.38 Likewise, the three largest tax
expenditures supporting home ownership were estimated at $123.8 billion in 2014 ($67.8 billion
for home mortgage interest, $31.9 billion for property taxes, and $24.1 billion for profits from
residence).39 This rough estimate suggests that health insurance and homeownership together
($267.5 billion) cost more than the interest on the national debt ($231 billion).40 Like direct
expenditures, tax expenditures support a broad range of activities, including charity ($46.9
billion),41 research and development ($10.2 billion),42 green energy ($3.8 billion),43 earned
income ($69.2 billion),44 retirement savings ($132 billion),45 and education ($33.6 billion).46

34

Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, JCT Identifies 1.2 Trillion of Tax Breaks This Year, Aug. 7, 2014,
http://crfb.org/blogs/jct-identifies-12-trillion-tax-breaks-year; Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2014-18, Aug. 5, 2014, [hereinafter “Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates”],
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4663; see also McBride, supra note 3, at 1 (Treasury
estimates tax expenditures budget is $1.2 trillion, with joint committee at $1.3 trillion, representing 96% growth
since 1991). This sum is only a rough estimate, since tax expenditure estimates do not account for behavioral or
interaction effects of repeal or limits. See generally Rosanne Altshuler & Robert Dietz, Reconsidering Tax
Expenditure Estimation, 64 NAT. TAX J 459, 486 (2011) (“tax expenditures cannot be summed to determine the
revenue consequences of eliminating sets of preferences due to interaction effects”).
35
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_United_States_federal_budget.
36
McBride, supra note 3, at 1 (representing 96% growth since 1991).
37
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31.
38
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_United_States_federal_budget.
39
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 25-26.
40
Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Projection of Federal Interest Payments, Nov. 2014,
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/45684.
41
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29, 31.
42
See Appendix, infra.
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B. Politics and the Proliferation of One-Size-Fits-All Proposals
Since so much money is at stake, it is not surprising that nonpartisan commissions,
politicians on both sides of the aisle, and leading academics have proposed to scale back tax
expenditures in various ways. Yet advancing this agenda is not easy, since tax expenditures have
deep political roots. They offer concentrated benefits to organized interest groups, and are
subject to less scrutiny than spending programs under congressional rules.47 Tax expenditures
also allow taxpayers to keep money they already have, drawing strength from a cognitive bias
known as the endowment effect.48
Even so, limiting tax expenditures has four political advantages over other ways to cut
the deficit. First, for some voters, limits are less salient than rate increases.49 Like the
alternative minimum tax, their effects can be hard to discern, particularly for less sophisticated
taxpayers.50 Second, this is especially true when politicians promise to impose limits, but do not
specify which tax expenditures they will target. While they eventually have to fill in specifics,
the proposal can gain momentum before then. Third, scaling back tax expenditures can be
characterized as either a tax increase or a spending cut. This hybrid quality gives some “cover”
to both political parties. Republicans who pledged not to raise taxes can say they kept their
promise, as can Democrats who promised not to cut social programs.51 Fourth, policies that
43

See Appendix, infra.
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32.
45
See Appendix, infra.
46
See Appendix, infra. The appendix offers more detail about these and other examples. Of over 200 tax
expenditures identified by the joint committee in 2013, the top five were: Exclusion of health insurance; exclusion
of pensions; preferential treatment of dividends and capital gains; state and local taxes; and mortgage interest.
Toder, Rosenberg, Eng, supra, Table 1, at 17 (quoting Joint Committee’s 2013 numbers).
47
Edward D. Kleinbard, Tax Expenditure Framework Legislation, 63 NAT. TAX J. 353 (2010).
48
Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 220 (2004)
[hereinafter “Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures”] (“A deeper cause [of the appeal of tax expenditures] is the
heuristic bias that decision researchers call the endowment effect, under which people systematically under-weight
opportunity costs relative to equivalent out-of-pocket costs.”); Weisbach & Nissim, supra, at 970 (“They may
perceive a tax subsidy as merely letting them keep their money, even while they perceive an identical program that
taxes them and gives the money back through programs or services to be a subsidy”).
49
See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. REG. 253, 310 (2011)
(arguing that in a “political landscape where there is a looming fiscal crisis but tax aversion and the politics of
taxation make raising additional revenue extremely difficult,” Congress should use “low salience provisions that
make taxation palatable.”).
50
As other examples, Professor Schenk mentions the Pease rule, limits on personal exemptions and, more generally,
limits on tax expenditures. Id. at 277; see also id. (“For example, interaction between various provisions may
obscure their effects. For instance, the nominal marginal tax rate is quite salient but often it does not apply because
other provisions, such as income ceilings and phase-outs, have the effect of increasing the rate.”); Manning &
Andress, supra note 23, at 1614 (“the overall limitation on itemized deductions . . . [was] probably deliberately
designed to obscure their effect on the [rate] structure and particularly their creation of higher brackets at lower
amounts of income.”).
51
Admittedly, this is the opposite of the traditional view about the bipartisan appeal of tax expenditures articulated
by Gene Steurle and others, but the political dynamic seems to be changing. Eugene Steuerle, Tax Policy from 1990
to 2001, in American Economic Policy in the 1990s 139, 154 (Jeffrey A. Frankel & Peter R. Orszag eds., 2002)
(“’conservatives’ still hold on to a belief that tax expenditures are reductions in tax and ways of giving money back
to the people,” Gene Steuerle has observed, “even while ‘liberals’ come to realize that they can achieve certain
social objectives more easily if enacted as a tax cut.”); see also Eric Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending – Does it Make a
44
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make the overall economic pie grow can attract a political following. Constituents who expect to
reap these welfare gains can become political allies. The same is true of interest groups who do
not currently benefit from a tax expenditure, and thus would not be adversely affected by a limit.
Instead of being indifferent, they will affirmatively support this limit if they expect an alternative
response to the deficit – such as higher marginal rates, spending cuts, or deficit spending – would
burden them.52
Yet although there is growing political interest in scaling back tax expenditures, a
common problem is that proposals often treat all (or almost all) tax expenditures the same way.
A prominent example is the Bowles Simpson commission of 2010,53 which “relies on zero-base
budgeting by eliminating all income tax expenditures . . . and then using the revenue to lower
rates and reduce deficits.”54 Commentators and politicians routinely praise the Bowles Simpson
report,55 and rarely focus on its reliance on a uniform approach.
Likewise, both presidential candidates in 2012 proposed uniform approaches to scaling
back tax expenditures. President Obama sought to limit the value of a broad range of tax
expenditures to 28%. His proposal applied to all itemized deductions as well as a number of
exclusions.56 Meanwhile, Governor Romney suggested an overall cap on itemized deductions.

Difference? , 53 NAT. TAX J. 361, 361 (“Tax incentives serve the needs of political leaders by enabling them to
appear to reduce spending and taxes, while at the same time pursuing an activist policy that promotes popular
programs.”).
52
Cf. Siona Listokin, Yair Listokin & Samson Mesel, Americans’ Preferences for Tax Increases and Spending Cuts,
TAX NOTES, Apr. 8, 2012, at 188 (58% of survey respondents support repeal of state and local tax deduction, while
53% support repeal of home mortgage interest deduction; in contrast, 84% supported tax increases on “at least
some” (unspecified) Americans, while 66% supported cuts in (unspecified) nondefense spending, and 64%
supported cuts in (unspecified) defense programs).
53
The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth (2010),
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf.
54
The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, supra, at 29. In addition to this “zero option,”
the commission also offers alternative proposals that retain but scale back a few tax expenditures (e.g., offering a
limited 12% credit for mortgage interest and charity).
55
See, e.g., Steven I. Platt, Bring Back Simpson and Bowles, Idaho Bus. Rev., Dec. 3, 2012,
http://idahobusinessreview.com/2012/12/03/bring-back-simpson-and-bowles/#ixzz3IgSJxv6B (“Both Simpson and
Bowles enjoy the almost universal respect and admiration not only of the other members of the commission, but also
of the president and the leadership of both sides and parties in Congress”); Darrell M. West & Ashley Gabriele, Ten
Leadership Lessons from Simpson-Bowles, Governance Studies at Brookings, Nov. 2012,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2012/11/14%20simpson%20bowles%20west/14%20simp
son%20bowles%20west.pdf (distilling a number of “fiscal leadership lessons” from Simpson-Bowles);
56
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals 74 (2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf (“any tax-exempt
state and local bond interest, employer-sponsored health insurance paid for by employers or with before-tax
employee dollars, health insurance costs of self-employed individuals, employee contributions to defined
contribution retirement plans and individual retirement arrangements, the deduction for income attributable to
domestic production activities, certain trade and business deductions of employees, moving expenses, contributions
to health savings accounts and Archer MSAs, interest on education loans, . . . certain higher education expenses, . . .
[and] itemized deductions after they have been reduced by the statutory limitation on certain itemized deductions for
higher income taxpayers.”).
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He originally proposed a $17,000 cap and then increased it to $25,000.57 This cap applied to a
basket of tax expenditures, although the proposal did not specify which were included.
Similarly, the UK introduced an overall cap on “tax reliefs” in 2012, limiting them to the
greater of 50,000 pounds or 25% of income. The stated rationale was “to help ensure that those
with the highest incomes pay a fairer share.”58 Commentators have urged other jurisdictions to
follow this model.59
There are obvious political advantages to proposals that apply uniformly to all tax
expenditures. They spread the pain more broadly. Each interest group has less reason to resist if
it is footing only a fraction of the bill. Congress also can say that “we are all in this together,”
casting interest groups that seek special treatment in a less flattering light.60 It may also be
harder for interest groups – or at least for average voters – to predict a limit’s effects when it
applies to a basket of tax expenditures, instead of a single one. Likewise, defenders of a global
limit can say (somewhat disingenuously) that they are not targeting any specific tax expenditure,
but are merely making sure that taxpayers do not use too many or lower their tax bill too much.61
Yet in addition to politicians, leading academics also have advocated uniform treatment
of tax expenditures. Governor Romney’s cap originally comes from Professor Martin Feldstein,
although Feldstein’s proposal uses a percentage of income to define the cap (2% of adjusted
gross income), instead of a dollar amount ($17,000 or $25,000). Also, instead of capping the
amount that can be deducted or excluded, as Romney does, Feldstein caps the tax benefit that can
be claimed; under Feldstein’s proposal, then, someone in a higher bracket (who derives more tax
benefit per dollar) can claim fewer dollars of deductions and exclusions. Feldstein’s basket cap
covers a very broad range of tax expenditures. Earlier versions apply to all itemized deductions,
the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance, as well as some credits,62 while later
versions exclude the charitable deduction.63
Likewise, in a recent book, Professor Edward Kleinbard advocates recasting all personal
itemized deductions as 15% credits. “The reason to curb all the personal itemized deductions,”
57

See Steven J. Entlin, Analysis of Romney's Tax Plan With and Without a $25,000 Cap on Itemized Deductions,
The Tax Foundation, http://taxfoundation.org/article/analysis-romneys-tax-plan-and-without-25000-cap-itemizeddeductions.
58
HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2012 33 (2012),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://cdn.hmtreasury.gov.uk/budget2012_complete.pdf
59
See, e.g., Warren, supra, at 359.
60
See Feldstein, supra note 7 (”The 2% overall cap on tax expenditures should be politically more acceptable than
changes in the treatment of mortgage interest or other specific deductions because it treats all tax expenditures
equally.”); Walter J. Blum, Federal Income Tax Reform—Twenty Questions, 41 TAXES 672, 679 (1963) (“[T]he
existence of any one special dispensation makes it easier to argue on behalf of others. . . . [A] Spartan attitude
toward defending the integrity of the base will aid in creating the impression that the reform plan is intended to
improve the system as a whole, with the chips falling as they may, and is not calculated to benefit certain
identifiable groups possessing political strength.”).
61
Warren, supra, at 376 (arguing that global caps “elicit far less strident criticism as they do not target one particular
group but all taxpayers whose total deductions increase with increasing income”).
62

Martin Feldstein, Daniel Feenberg, Maya MacGuineas, Capping Individual Tax Expenditure Benefits, NBER
Working Paper No. 16921 (April 2011).
63
See Feldstein, supra note 7 (“The existing charitable deduction in particular deserves to be maintained.”)
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he argues, “is that it is impossible to choose among them. Each can be defended as an incentive
for one desirable goal or another.”64 Echoing this theme, Professor Neil Warren advocates “the
UK approach where the focus is on global caps rather than imposing specific caps on a myriad of
individual itemized deductions.”65
Similarly, tax expenditures are treated uniformly in a prominent proposal by Lily
Batchelder, Fred Goldberg, and Peter Orszag. Their focus is not on how to limit tax
expenditures, but how to structure them. They want each tax expenditure to be a refundable
credit (so that it is available even to those who would not otherwise owe tax), instead of a
deduction or exclusion. This way, all taxpayers receive the same marginal reimbursement rate,
whether they have low or high incomes. To be clear, their goal is uniformity among taxpayers,
not among tax expenditures (so they are not arguing that all tax expenditure should have the
same marginal reimbursement rate). Rather, they offer an efficiency-based argument that
uniform treatment of all taxpayers should be the default.66

II.

Three-Part Framework: Programmatic Benefits, Excess Burden, and
Distribution

Notwithstanding their political advantages, one-size-fits-all approaches are not good
policy. Rather, in deciding whether to scale back a tax expenditure, we should use contextspecific cost-benefit analysis. As Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki have shown, we should
consider how welfare costs and benefits change at the margin.67
A. A Context-Specific Framework
This Part offers a three-part framework for these judgments. We should begin with the
programmatic benefits we lose. For example, if the exclusion for employer-provided health
insurance is scaled back, will people be less healthy? Likewise, if a tax expenditure has negative
effects, repealing or limiting it could reduce these programmatic costs. The balance is different
for each tax expenditure. Section B explores these issues.
Second, how does scaling back a tax expenditure affect excess burden?68 For tax
expenditures that add more to deadweight loss, repeal or a limit is especially appealing. Yet if
repeal or the limit itself creates deadweight loss, the case becomes weaker. Again, there is no
one-size-fits all answer. Section C considers these questions.
64

KLEINBARD, supra, at 383.
Warren, supra, at 359.
66
Batchelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 8, at 24.
67
See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Integrating Expenditure and Tax Decisions, supra note 12.
68
Models in this literature typically use optimal taxation, supplemented by commodity taxes that pursue
redistribution or correct for externalities. See, e.g., Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation in the Presence of
Externalities, 77 SWEDISH J. ECON.86 (1975) (incorporating externalities in an optimal tax framework and showing
that usual commodity taxes based on elasticity must be coupled with taxes and subsidies targeting externalities);
Jukka Pirttila and Ronnie Schob, Redistribution and Internalization: The Many-Person Ramsey Rule Revisited, 27
PUB. FIN. REV. 541, 554 (1999) (“the modified many-person Ramsey tax rule reveals that the influence of
commodity taxation on the demand for taxed goods depends on both redistributional and environmental
objectives.”).
65
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A third important factor is distribution. If a tax expenditure particularly benefits lowincome taxpayers, scaling it back is less appealing. Likewise, we should be more wary of
administrative and programmatic costs that burden these taxpayers. How much we favor lowincome taxpayers depends on our social welfare function. Whether a limit disproportionately
affects them depends on the context. For example, the earned income tax credit and mortgage
interest deduction have different distributional impact, so limiting them in the same way has
different welfare effects. Section D analyzes these issues.69
This framework focuses on what we lose in repealing or limiting a tax expenditure. The
offsetting benefit, of course, is that the government saves money. To know how much this
savings enhances welfare, we need to know how it will be used.70 Will we cut taxes? Will we
avoid raising them? Will we cut the deficit? Or fund a new initiative? The case for repeal or
limits is stronger if we use the savings wisely.71 But this a separate issue, which is beyond this
Article’s scope. Before we determine the best way to use savings, we first need to generate it –
ideally, at the lowest possible (welfare) cost.
Although the rest of this Part discusses programmatic benefits, excess burden and
distribution separately, analyzing only one without the others does not yield a conclusive
assessment. While examples are offered at various points to clarify the analysis, they are merely
illustrative, and are not meant as definitive recommendations. Such a thorough analysis would
require fact-specific inquiries that are beyond this Article’s scope. Instead, the goal here is to
clarify the relevant questions, identify tradeoffs and patterns, and develop more general lessons.
B. What Programmatic Benefits Do We Lose in Repealing or Limiting a Tax
Expenditure?

69

Excess burden and distribution need not be considered, as Louis Kaplow has shown, if the government can tell
what benefit each individual derives from a program and charges each taxpayer this amount. This benefits tax
involves no redistribution or behavioral distortions, since people are simply paying for value. Louis Kaplow, The
Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT. TAX J. 513, 514 (when “any
reduction in disposable income due to the tax adjustment is balanced by the benefit from the public good,” work
effort and utility level are unaffected and “the simple cost-benefit formula indicates whether the public good should
be supplied”); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation, NBER Working
Paper 12339 (2006) (formalizing this result). But if the program is financed with a tax that involves redistribution
and behavioral distortions, as is generally the case, these additional factors must be considered.
70
Indeed, it could be that the same limit is cost-justified if the savings is used one way, but not another. Cf. Slemrod
and Yitzhaki, supra (when tax and transfer policy is not set optimally, decision about whether to add a new
government program depends on how it will be funded; answer can change if one funding source is used instead of
another ); see also, e.g., Michael Schuyler, The Effect of Terminating Tax Expenditures and Cutting Individual Tax
Rates, Sept. 30, 2013, [hereinafter “Terminating Tax Expenditures and Cutting Individual Tax Rates”],
http://taxfoundation.org/article/effects-terminating-tax-expenditures-and-cutting-individual-income-tax-rates (using
Tax Foundation’s taxes and growth model to simulate effects of cutting various tax expenditures with and without
rate cuts; simulations suggest that rate cuts are needed to counteract potentially significant adverse effects on
growth).
71
Of course, if tax and spending policies were optimal, then this would not be the case. As Slemrod and Yitzhaki
have observed, the marginal benefit from all public projects and the marginal cost of public funds would all be the
same. Otherwise, we would replace low-benefit projects with higher benefit ones, and we would replace higher-cost
funding sources with lower-cost ones, until all were equal at the margin. Slemrod and Yitzhaki, supra note 12, at
191-96. Yet only the staunchest optimist would suggest that current tax and spending policies are anything close to
optimal.
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This Section considers the programmatic benefits we lose when scaling back a tax
expenditure. We want to keep as much as possible, even as we cut costs. The goal, then, is to
extract more programmatic benefits per subsidy dollar – that is, “more bang for the buck.”
1. Externalities, Private Benefits, and Incidence
The priority should be to preserve positive externalities (as opposed to private benefits),
since otherwise these benefits to third parties would be undersupplied. At the margin, a subsidy
usually should equal the marginal positive externalities it creates (net of any marginal negative
externalities).72 By contrast, the market usually provides private benefits without a subsidy. For
example, we don’t need to subsidize mortgage interest to ensure that wealthy people live in
houses they like. However, some private benefits are worth subsidizing for distributional
reasons. An important justification for the earned income tax credit (“EITC”), for instance, is the
private benefits it offers to low-income taxpayers.
In assessing the value of externalities and private benefits, we need to account for
economic incidence. For example, if the EITC enables employers to reduce wages, the real
beneficiary is the employer instead of the employee. Likewise, a subsidy for health insurance
might drive up the cost of care, benefiting health care providers more than policyholders.
Obviously, we need to know who is really benefitting in order to determine how valuable a
subsidy is.
2. Three Possibilities: Repeal, Status Quo, or Tightening Strategies
A tax expenditure (or, indeed, any government program) that is counterproductive
obviously is a promising candidate for repeal. For instance, cigarette companies used to argue
that cigarettes – or at least some brands – were good for a smoker’s health.73 If a subsidy had
been enacted to encourage better health through smoking, the right response obviously would be
to repeal it.
The same is true of a tax expenditure that offers only meager programmatic benefits. For
example, if a tax expenditure enables the government to endorse a particular activity, but fails to
induce more of it, the government should look for cheaper ways to make a symbolic statement.
In contrast, it is costly to scale back a tax expenditure that produces substantial positive
externalities. For instance, accelerated depreciation and other investment incentives arguably
promote economic growth more effectively than marginal rate cuts (and, in fact, would not be

72

Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Government Policy, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. Fall 2004, at 160-64 (optimal subsidy equates marginal social benefit of activity with marginal social
cost). It also can be lower if these externalities correlate with leisure, and higher if they correlate with another
(unsubsidized) externality. This is equivalent to offsetting the subsidy with a commodity tax. Saez, supra note 12;
Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT. TAX J. 513,
518 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation 11, 15, 18 (NBER
Working Paper No. 12339, 2006)
73
Leah Lawrence, Cigarettes Were Once ‘Physician’ Tested, Approved, HEALIO, Mar. 10, 2009,
http://www.healio.com/hematology-oncology/news/print/hemonc-today/%7B241d62a7-fe6e-4c5b-9feda33cc6e4bd7c%7D/cigarettes-were-once-physician-tested-approved.
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classified as “tax expenditures” under a consumption tax baseline). 74 Robust programmatic
benefits can supply a powerful reason to keep a tax expenditure, although we also should account
for excess burden and distribution.
Yet even if a tax expenditure (or any government program) is worth preserving, we
should try to attain all (or most) of its programmatic benefits at lower budgetary cost. The rest of
this Part identifies five ways to do so: first, defining the funded activity more precisely; second,
identifying more responsive claimants; third, favoring claimants who will make more effective
use of the subsidy; fourth, calibrating how much activity we should fund, both for each claimant
and overall; fifth, housing the program in a part of the government that can implement it most
effectively. In choosing a strategy, we have to account for the factual context, as well as excess
burden and distribution. What works for one tax expenditure may not work for another.
3. Which Activity Do We Want to Encourage?: Definitional Strategies
A familiar way to “tighten up” a tax expenditure is to define the funded activity more
precisely. A clearer and more focused signal presumably is more likely to motivate the behavior
we want. There is value, then, in explicitly excluding low-value activities. For example,
education credits exclude “education involving sports, games, or hobbies” as well as
nonacademic fees.75 The reason presumably is that these expenses add less to human capital
than academic tuition, and also are not easy to distinguish from leisure.
Yet precision is helpful only if it actually distinguishes high- and low-value activities,
and this is not always the case. For example, detailed rules specify what qualifies as a deductible
medical expense, but the answers sometimes seem arbitrary: removing lead paint is deductible,
but covering it with wallpaper is not; breast pumps are deductible, while maternity clothes are
not, and so on.76
Precise definitions also can be costly to formulate and administer. Sometimes these costs
are justified, but sometimes they are not. For example, the charitable deduction arguably should
cover for-profit charity, as well as gifts to family and friends, since these activities can generate
positive externalities. Yet a key problem with subsidizing them, as Professor Kaplow has
observed, is the challenge of distinguishing them from standard commercial arrangements.77

74

For example, a widely cited study claims that repealing accelerated depreciation and other investment incentives
to fund reductions in the corporate tax rate would slow growth. See John W. Diamond, Thomas S. Neubig &
George R. Zodrow, The Dynamic Economic Effects of a U.S. Corporate Income Tax Rate Reduction (June 17, 2011)
(on file with Oxford University Said Business School), available at
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/tax/symposia/Documents/Diamon_Zodrow%20_Neubig%20final.pdf. Other
studies conclude that repealing individual tax expenditures that favor savings and investment would significantly
reduce savings and investment; the effect is especially pronounced if repeal is not accompanied by an across the
board rate cut, but remains even if it is. See, e.g., Schuyler, Terminating Tax Expenditures and Cutting Individual
Tax Rates, supra note 51.
75
Section 25A(f).
76
See generally IRS Publication 502, Medical and Dental Expenses (2013),
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p502/ar02.html.
77
Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, supra note 17. (“Of course, any rationale for subsidizing gifts
assumes that, as a practical matter, they can be distinguished from payments for goods or services. But the presence
of return flows from beneficiaries to donors (which could even include returning the gift itself) would often be
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In some cases, the government does not have the substantive expertise or political
independence to develop precise funding parameters. For these reasons, the R&D credit is
imprecise by design. The government is not well positioned to determine which technologies are
most promising. Instead, the R&D credit uses expansive criteria, such as requiring projects to be
“technological in nature,” and “useful in the development of a new or improved business
component.”78 The charitable deduction is similarly broad and vague. Its nondirective approach
promotes experimentation, enabling the government to fund causes that would not (yet) be
supported by the median voter. As a result, the civil rights movement, environmentalism, and
the women’s rights movement all were launched with deductible charitable contributions.79 At
the same time, a nondirective approach also creates the risk that undeserving activities will be
funded. The optimal balance between promoting experimentation and reducing waste will vary
for each tax expenditure, and excess burden and distribution must also be considered. Again,
there is no one-size-fits-all answer.
4. Which Claimants are Easiest to Motivate?: Elasticity Strategies
Once the favored conduct has been defined, a key question is how much the government
must pay to induce more of it. Obviously, less is better. Another familiar strategy, then, is to
favor claimants who are relatively open to the favored conduct, and thus respond to a leaner
subsidy. 80s “By targeting the subsidy to those whose tastes for the favored commodity are
relatively intense,” Alan Blinder and Harvey Rosen have observed, a subsidy “does not `waste’
money on those whose consumption is not stimulated very much.”81
The amount needed to change behavior will vary with the person, as well as the tax
expenditure. Sometimes tastes and philosophical commitments are relevant. For instance, it
probably is easier to persuade a committed environmentalist to buy solar panels.
Typically, high-income taxpayers are easier to influence, since they have more capacity
in their budgets. For example, if we want someone to commit $25,000 to solar panels or a fuel
efficient car, a potential claimant earning $2.5 million is easier to persuade than one earning
$50,000. In response, we can structure the subsidy so it declines with income, or we can set it at
the (leaner) level that is appropriate for high-income claimants. Likewise, limiting the subsidy to
difficult to detect, particularly for gifts within the family. This administrative constraint may be more of a problem
with respect to private giving than contributions to public charities.”)
78
Section 41(d).
79
Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions, supra note 17.
80
See Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT. TAX J.
513, 518 (1996); Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities, 77 SWEDISH J. OF ECON. 86, 9293 (1975) (“even in a world of distortionary taxation where the allocative functions of the price system cannot be
separated from its effects on distribution, there is scope for taxing externality-generating commodities according to
the Pigouvian principle” and “the optimal tax rate for the externality-creating commodity is a weighted average of
the inverse elasticity and the marginal social damage”); Saez, supra note 12, at 2659 (“First and most obviously, the
size of the subsidy is closely related to the size of the external effects. . . . Second, the optimal subsidy is positively
related to the price elasticity of the contribution good.”); Batchelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 8, at 46. In
general, this Article focuses on uncompensated elasticity, so we do not assume that income is adjusted to eliminate
any income effects.
81
Alan S. Blinder & Harvey S. Rosen, Notches, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 736 (1985) (analyzing “notch” strategies that
vary subsidy with consumption levels, including floor on charitable deduction; arguing that “reasonable notch
schemes make smaller demands on the treasury . . . but often have larger excess burdens” and that this tradeoff can
be worthwhile because “real world tax finance creates its own efficiency costs”).
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itemizers tends to channel it to high-income claimants. Of course, distribution or excess burden
sometimes counsels against this approach, and should be weighted in the balance.
Although claimants should be responsive, they should not be too responsive. We should
not pay for what taxpayers would do anyway, a form of waste sometimes called “buying the
base.”82 For example, subsidizing the first dollar of charity is wasteful if everyone would give
this amount without a subsidy.83 In response, we can disallow charitable contributions below a
floor. In other work, I have suggested a charitable credit that becomes more generous as
taxpayers give a higher percentage of their income to charity.84 Likewise, President Bush’s 2005
tax reform panel proposed to subsidize charity only above 1% of income.85 Yet a familiar
challenge is that preferences vary. For example, although many Americans give at least 1% of
their income to charity – and some receive no subsidy, since they claim the standard deduction –
a 1% floor would still be too high for some and too low for others.86 Some will stop giving,
some will receive an infra-marginal subsidy, and some will reduce their contribution to offset the
subsidy they lost through the floor.87 These competing effects should all be considered in
deciding whether, and where, to set a floor (along with excess burden and distribution).
5. Which Claimants Will Make Most Effective Use of the Subsidy?
Comparative-Advantage Strategies
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A third approach is to favor claimants who make the most effective use of a subsidy. In
some circumstances, claimants are fungible. For instance, assume we want to subsidize
carpooling to reduce negative externalities from traffic, such as delays, noise, and accidents. We
are unlikely to care which commuters claim this subsidy, as long as enough do.
In contrast, factors such as expertise, infrastructure or even weather sometimes give
claimants a comparative advantage. For example, if our goal is to encourage technological
innovation, engineers have an edge over literary critics and musicians. Similarly, some
charitable donors make wiser philanthropic decisions than others. Alternatively, assume our goal
is to reduce fuel consumption as a way to enhance national security (by reducing imports from
unstable or hostile countries). If we subsidize mass transit, residents of Manhattan (which has
extensive mass transit) can use the subsidy more effectively than residents of rural Kansas
(which does not). Likewise, subsidizing weather stripping to conserve fuel in heating homes is
more effective in frigid Chicago than in mild Los Angeles..
For some tax expenditures, financial need is a source of comparative advantage. Private
benefits to low income claimants add more to welfare, given diminishing marginal utility. In
addition to distribution, there also is an externalities-based reason. If a community is committed
to supporting anyone who is not self-sufficient, the community saves money when people
become self-sufficient. Someone who enters the workforce no longer relies on the community
for support. The same is true when he funds his own health care, housing, and retirement
savings. By inducing people to take these steps, a subsidy can generate what this Article calls
“self-sufficiency externalities.” Low-income claimants are especially likely to generate these
externalities, since they are at greater risk of depending on the community.88
In promoting self-sufficiency externalities, we target those who (by definition) would not
otherwise engage in the favored conduct (e.g., working or saving for retirement). If we are
successful, the good news is that we are less likely to pay for what claimants would do anyway.
The other side of this coin, though, is that these claimants are (by definition) resistant, rather than
responsive. As a result, they are harder (and more expensive) to motivate. For these subsidies,
greater welfare gains come at greater cost.
But fortunately, this tradeoff between comparative advantage and elasticity does not
always arise. In other contexts, taxpayers who make the most effective use of a subsidy are also
the most responsive. For example, the same reason Chicagoans use weather stripping more
effectively than Angelenos – the cold weather – also makes them want it more. As a result,
Chicagoans require less persuasion to buy it. The same is true of mass transit subsidies. Since
Manhattan residents actually can use this subsidy, they will be more responsive. Likewise, it
will be easier to persuade an engineer than a literary critic to engage in R&D. Since claimants
would have to invest time and resources, they are more likely to do so if they expect a return.
Thus, while we have a uniform goal with each subsidy – to favor claimants who generate
the most welfare per subsidy dollar – we should pursue this goal differently for each tax
88

Another option is simply to require the relevant behavior, or to penalize those who don’t engage in it. Yet even if
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although the Affordable Care Act penalizes those who do not buy health insurance, it also subsidizes policies for
low-income people. This brings us back to the analysis here.
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expenditure. If a claimant’s comparative advantage derives from financial need, an incomebased test may be the right mechanism. Yet if comparative advantage is rooted instead in a
claimant’s effectiveness in engaging in the favored conduct – given their preferences, location,
expertise, etc. – other approaches will be preferable. In some cases, we should sort claimants
with a competitive process, as when developers apply to state housing agencies for the lowincome housing credit. In other cases, substantive conditions can be introduced, for instance, so
weather-stripping is subsidized only in cold climates. We also can winnow with price. By
keeping the subsidy low, the government allocates it to taxpayers who are most willing to put up
their own money, such as researchers who are especially confident about R&D or philanthropists
who are particularly committed to a cause. The right strategy varies with the factual context and,
of course, must also account for excess burden and distribution.
6. How Much Favored Activity Do We Want? Activity-Level Strategies
In addition to defining the favored activity carefully and identifying the right claimants,
we also need to calibrate the amount of activity we want to subsidize. Another tightening
strategy, then, is to focus on how much funded activity we want overall and, in some cases, how
much we want per claimant.
For any tax expenditure, there are likely to be diminishing returns when we encourage
more favored activity in the aggregate. Once we have funded all the high value projects (e.g.,
solar panels in sunny locations), the remaining low-value projects (e.g., cloudy locations) offer
less bang for the buck. In response, Congress can cap its overall annual spending on a tax
expenditure. Although common for direct expenditures, a fixed appropriation is rare for tax
expenditures. Congress does use one, though, for the low income housing credit.
a. Individually-Based Tax Expenditures Versus Aggregate Tax Expenditures
Marginal returns can vary not only with the overall activity level, but also with the
activity level of each claimant. These variations are crucial for some tax expenditures, and
minor for others. Distinguishing these two types of tax expenditure is a contribution of this
Article. This difference affects the type of limit we should use.
Sometimes the activity level of each claimant is quite important. For instance, assume
our goal in subsidizing retirement savings is to keep retirees from becoming a burden on the
community. With this goal, subsidizing someone who otherwise would save only $100
generates more positive externalities than someone who would save $1,000,000 without a
subsidy. When we are promoting self-sufficiency, then, marginal positive externalities decline
as an individual engages in more of the favored activity.
In contrast, sometimes only the aggregate activity level is relevant, while the per-person
level is not. In these cases, once we identify the right pool of potential claimants, we can rely on
a blunt allocation to this group, without worrying about how much each individual claims.
Subsidized solar panels are an example. If the goal is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, we
want panels to be installed in sunny locations. But once we do that, it does not matter whether
we subsidize one panel on each house, or two on every other house. Either way, we are
replacing carbon-based energy. On a claimant-by-claimant basis, marginal positive externalities
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from solar panels do not decline in the same way (although they can decline as activity levels
rise in the aggregate).
This Article uses the phrase “aggregate tax expenditure” to describe the solar panel
example, as well as other tax expenditures whose marginal programmatic benefits vary primarily
with aggregate activity levels. In contrast, this Article uses the phrase ”individually-based tax
expenditure” to describe the retirement example, as well as other tax expenditures whose
marginal programmatic benefits also vary substantially with individual activity levels.
Different limits are appropriate for these two categories. If our goal is to encourage
enough retirement savings so that people are self-sufficient, we should cap the amount of each
claimant’s subsidized savings. This sort of cap focuses the subsidy on high-value uses (i.e., the
minimum needed for self-sufficiency). In contrast, setting a cap of, say, one solar panel per
claimant does not offer the same advantage (although there could be other rationales for such a
limit, grounded in budgetary impact, excess burden, or distribution.)
b. Examples of Individually-Based Tax Expenditures
The defining feature of an individually-based tax expenditure, then, is that programmatic
benefits vary as individual activity levels change. There are several reasons why this can be the
case. The first is that marginal positive externalities can decline. This is true of subsidies that
encourage self-sufficiency, such as subsidized retirement savings and the EITC. After all, it
makes sense to subsidize an extra dollar of earnings when someone’s annual pay is $10,000, but
not $200,000. (Obviously, there is a distributional rationale as well, as noted above.)89 A similar
analysis applies to education credits. If the goal is to encourage the minimum human capital
people need to support themselves, marginal programmatic benefits decline in a similar way. If
so, per-claimant caps on these tax expenditures are likely to enhance their “bang for the buck”
(although we also have to consider excess burden and distribution).
Second, even if positive externalities remain constant (or increase) as the subsidy
becomes more generous, there can still be a net marginal decline if programmatic costs increase
(more). This is true of tax-free fringe benefits. To avoid administrative costs, employees are not
taxed on occasional free meals, modest employee discounts, and the like. Yet this administrative
savings comes at a price. Fringe benefits distort compensation practices, since their tax
treatment is more favorable than cash. Because some industries can offer them more easily than
others, their labor costs are lower. These distortions become more serious as fringe benefits
become more valuable. As the subsidy per claimant increases in this way, programmatic costs
come to outweigh the administrative savings. This shifting balance suggests that tax free
treatment should be limited to low-value fringe benefits, as generally is the case under current
law.
The analysis is similar for subsidized health insurance. A subsidy for basic policies is
sufficient to generate most of the positive externalities we want, while a subsidy for “gold
plated” policies introduces new problems. After all, basic policies keep people from depending
89

See supra Part II.B.1. Yair Listokin has argued that there also is a separate macroeconomic effect. Since
taxpayers are more likely to lose their jobs in a recession, EITC payments are likely to decline, rendering this tax
expenditure countercyclical. Listokin, Equity, Efficiency and Stability, supra note 24, at 45 (analyzing
macroeconomic impact of a number of tax expenditures).
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on the community for health care. They also broaden the insurance pool, so risk is spread more
effectively. In addition, basic policies ordinarily prevent people from infecting others and enable
them to discharge responsibilities to coworkers, family, other drivers on the road, etc. So what
changes if we also subsidize “gold-plated” policies? There could be more funding for medical
research, which generates positive externalities. Yet there also would be private benefits, such as
more convenient health care without long waits, which do not justify a subsidy. In addition, we
might encourage overspending and drive up health care costs (e.g., if deductibles and
copayments are lower), thereby generating negative externalities.90 It is plausible, then, that
increasing the subsidy per claimant causes marginal programmatic benefits to decline on a net
basis (e.g., if the effect on costs outweighs the effect on research). If so, a per-claimant cap
increases this tax expenditure’s bang for the buck (although, again, we also have to account for
excess burden and distribution).91
Likewise, subsidized home ownership also involves increasing programmatic costs. The
purchase of a more expensive home can inspire envy or pressure others to spend more so they
“keep up with the Joneses.”92 There are also negative externalities if homeowners are less able
to move for a new job, which could be more daunting with more expensive houses. On the other
side of the ledger, there are positive externalities if homeowners are more committed than renters
to improving neighborhoods,93 and if a homeowner’s investment enhances the value of her
neighbors’ homes. It seems plausible that the balance of these competing effects becomes less
favorable as the subsidy per claimant increases. If so, an individually-based cap increases the
subsidy’s bang for the buck (although excess burden and distribution also must be considered).
Finally, although the focus so far has been on marginal programmatic benefits that
decline, they also can increase as a claimant engages in more favored activity. For example, if
the goal is to create a public park, it is more helpful for one person to donate a two-acre plot than
90
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for twenty people to donate unconnected one-tenth-of-an-acre plots. In addition, charitable
donors who give large gifts have a greater ability to monitor nonprofits, since they have added
influence and also more at stake. When there are scale economies in generating positive
externalities, caps can be counterproductive (although excess burden and distribution also must
be taken into account).
Given these various context-specific effects, there is no reason to expect the same limit to
be a good fit for each tax expenditure. Yet for individualized tax expenditures, if (net)
externalities decline as taxpayers engage in more activity, capping the amount each claimant can
claim can save money while preserving (most) programmatic benefits.
c. Examples of Aggregate Tax Expenditures
The analysis is quite different, though, for tax expenditures that seek to influence
aggregate, rather than individual, activity levels. Calibrating how much each claimant receives is
less important (and, indeed, can be unhelpful) in three situations. In the first, it does not matter
which claimant engages in the favored conduct, as long as enough do. In the carpooling example
above, a subsidy reduces negative externalities from traffic as long as a sufficient number of
drivers share rides, but we do not care which do. Congestion, noise, and the risk of accidents are
reduced as much when one commuter carpools all of the time as when two commuters carpool
half of the time. There is no obvious rationale, then, to limit how much carpooling each claimant
is encouraged to do.94
Second, in some cases claimants are not fungible – so we have to ensure they are part of
the group that uses the subsidy effectively – but the allocation within this group is less important.
For instance, we can reduce greenhouse gases more by installing solar panels in sunny climates,
as noted above. But once we impose that constraint, it does not matter whether there is one on
every house or two on every other house. In fact, a weather-related requirement may be
unnecessary, since residents of sunny climates are the most likely buyers anyway, as noted
above. Instead, requiring a claimant to bear some of the cost (a “matching mechanism”) may be
sufficient. We can offer the lowest subsidy needed to induce enough claimants to install solar
panels, knowing that environmentalists and wealthier households (all in sunny climates) are most
likely to claim it. Of course, excess burden and distribution could affect this assessment as well.
The analysis is similar when we want to reduce energy imports for national security
reasons. Weather stripping advances this goal more effectively in cold climates, as noted above.
Within this parameter, though, a subsidy can save the same amount of energy on Michigan
Avenue as on the South Side of Chicago. If so, the most cost effective way to generate these
programmatic benefits is to subsidize the more responsive claimant. Indeed, if the Michigan
Avenue family is more responsive – and they also have a ski cabin in Colorado – a second
subsidy for them could make sense (again, setting aside excess burden and distribution). The
analysis is similar for a subsidy that reduces energy imports by promoting fuel-efficient vehicles.
Third, in other cases it does matter who engages in the subsidized conduct, but the
government is not well positioned to screen claimants. For example, we are not indifferent about
94
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who claims the R&D subsidy, since some are more likely to engage in promising research. But
as noted above, the government may lack the expertise (and political independence) to choose
technological winners. Likewise, the charitable subsidy is supposed to promote experiments that
the median voter would not (yet) fund; by definition, a politically accountable institution is not
well suited to implement this strategy. Instead of relying on the government to choose among
competing proposals, then, these tax expenditures use vague language (e.g., “technological in
nature”) or rough proxies (e.g., the nonprofit form) to create a broad class of potentially eligible
claimants. Further winnowing is accomplished with a matching mechanism. If we are
reasonably confident in this allocation method, we can treat R&D and charity as more like
aggregate than individualized tax expenditures. After all, the goal is not to ensure that every
taxpayer engages in a minimum level of research and philanthropy, but to encourage more of this
conduct overall at the lowest possible cost. Unlike with the EITC or subsidized health insurance,
then, there is no obvious reason why marginal programmatic benefits decline as individual
activity levels increase.
This third category of aggregate tax expenditures, which is premised on the government’s
inability to allocate the funding effectively, is perhaps the most contestable. Admittedly, we
might still want a per-claimant cap if we are skeptical about these passive allocations, since a cap
can limit losses from misguided projects.95 Or we might want to limit the private benefits that
claimants receive, such as prestige or personal satisfaction from giving to charity.96
Alternatively, in the case of the charitable deduction, we might favor a cap so taxpayers have to
participate, at least to a degree, in funding publicly-determined priorities; presumably, this
communitarian notion underlies current law’s cap on the charitable deduction.97 Yet these
rationales for a cap are different from those for individualized subsidies: instead of seeking more
bang for the buck, they minimize risk or limit harm to other values. In any event, even if we
don’t want a per-claimant cap, we may want a per-claimant floor. If most businesses engage in
some R&D and most taxpayers give at least some charity anyway, subsidizing the first dollar is
wasteful, as noted above. In making these judgments, we also have to consider excess burden
and distribution.
While this Article distinguishes between aggregate and individualized tax expenditures,
the difference is more of a spectrum than a dichotomy. Some tax expenditures have elements of
both. As a result, how we classify a tax expenditure – and, more importantly, how we limit it –
depends on our policy priority. For example, while an education subsidy can create positive
externalities in funding a basic education that leads to self-sufficiency, as noted above, it also
can create positive externalities in funding an advanced education that leads to scientific
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research, public service, or entrepreneurship.98 Similarly, a retirement savings subsidy can
generate positive externalities in promoting not only self-sufficiency, but also capital formation,
which contributes to economic growth. In each case, a subsidy pursuing the first goal (selfsufficiency) generates externalities in encouraging a minimum level per claimant of education or
savings, but not more; yet a subsidy pursuing the second goal (human capital or capital
formation) also generates externalities at higher levels of education or savings, so we would want
to encourage as much as possible across the board. As a result, a per-claimant cap may no
longer be a good fit.
Likewise, a child credit can have this sort of hybrid quality, since it can be used to pursue
different goals. One is to avoid societal problems from a shrinking population, such as an
inadequate labor force or bankrupt social insurance. To do so, we would encourage more
children overall, without regard to who is having them (an aggregate subsidy). However, a
different goal is to provide assistance to families who especially need it. This goal requires us to
account for each family’s particular circumstances (e.g., income, number of children), so that an
individual-by-individual analysis becomes relevant.
To sum up, then, a subsidy generally should equal the (net) positive marginal
externalities it generates. In structuring a tax expenditure, then, we have to account for the
different reasons why it generates positive (or negative) externalities – or, at least, to decide
which is our priority. As a result, some subsidies need to be calibrated on an individual-byindividual basis, while some do not. Obviously, these are difficult and contestable decisions,
especially since we also should account for excess burden and distribution. Given the finetuning that is necessary, one-size-fits-all limits are unlikely to succeed.
7. Who Allocates the Funding?: Bureaucratic Strategies
In addition to defining the conduct, identifying the claimants, and calibrating the amount
of the subsidy, we should consider who should make these decisions. Another tightening
strategy, then, is to identify which part of the government is best positioned to make and
implement these judgments.
There are familiar arguments for converting tax expenditures to direct expenditures, as
Stanley Surrey and others have urged in an extensive literature.99 For example, instead of
excluding the interest on state bonds from federal taxes, the federal government can make grants
for projects vetted by federal experts. The hope is that these experts can generate more
programmatic benefits per dollar than an inexpert tax bureaucracy.100 Likewise, congressional
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committees with greater substantive expertise would monitor these programs, instead of the tax
committees.101
On the other hand, sometimes tax experts in Congress and the executive branch have a
comparative advantage in making these judgments. This is likely to be the case, for instance,
when subsidies are means-tested (e.g., EITC) or allocated passively to avoid politicized decisions
(e.g., R&D and charity). The tax system also can have an advantage when the goal is to
communicate information or influence norms. If the government wants to endorse particular
behavior – as a way to promote more favorable attitudes about it among citizens – this “stamp of
approval” has to be communicated in a way that citizens will notice. Nearly all citizens file
returns, so the tax system can be an effective channel for this sort of message.
In any event, the issues discussed so far generally remain relevant if a tax expenditure is
converted to a direct expenditure. We still have to decide how precisely to define the favored
conduct, which claimants to favor, how generous the subsidy should be, whether it should be
capped, and so on. Ultimately, the choice of whether to keep a subsidy in the tax system turns on
the factual and institutional context.102 Obviously, excess burden and distribution are also
relevant.103 So once again, a one-size-fits-all answer will not be reliable. In any event, given the
extensive attention this issue has received elsewhere, it is not the focus of this Article.
8. Caveat: Transition Costs
Finally, when we consider whether to scale back a tax expenditure, we also have to
account for familiar issues that arise with any change of policy. Given the extensive literature on
transitions,104 the discussion here is very brief. In deciding how rapidly to phase in an otherwise
desirable reform, we need to balance long term gains against short-term impact. Even for the
same policy change, these short-term consequences vary with the context. For example, scaling
back the mortgage interest deduction could have had positive short-term effects in 2003, taking
steam out of the housing bubble. But in 2009, after the bubble burst, further pressure on this
distressed market would have been problematic in the short term.
We also need to consider the benefits and costs of encouraging people to anticipate policy
changes. There are familiar advantages when doing so persuades them not to engage in socially
destructive behavior. At the same time, there is a downside. If taxpayers discount tax
expenditures for the possibility of repeal, they are less responsive to them. This raises the cost of
inducing socially valuable behavior. Again, the balance of these (and other) factors – and, thus,
the transition policy we want in a given case – will depend on the context.
*

*

*
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To sum up, then, a key goal in scaling back tax expenditures is saving money while
preserving (most) programmatic benefits. There are a number of ways to do this, and we should
choose the one best suited to our policy priority and the factual context. In some cases, we
should narrow the definition of what is funded. In others, we should target the right claimants or
limit how much they can claim. In still other cases, we should use a different government
agency to implement the subsidy. On all these policy dimensions, strategies that work for one
tax expenditure will not necessarily work for another.
C. Potential Tradeoff: Does Repealing or Limiting a Tax Expenditure Add
to Excess Burden?
Even if a limit is effective at preserving programmatic benefits, we face a tradeoff if it
exacerbates excess burden or undermines our distributional goals. These issues are discussed in
this Section and Section D, respectively. To assess the impact on excess burden, this Section
considers three questions. First, how (if at all) would repeal or a limit affect the effective
marginal tax rate, or otherwise influence labor and savings decisions? Second, how would repeal
or a limit influence compliance, enforcement, and other administrative costs? Third, how would
it impact deadweight loss from tax planning?
1. Effect on Labor and Savings Decisions
a. Weakening Tax Expenditures that Promote Work or Savings
Repealing or limiting a tax expenditure can affect labor and savings decisions in five
ways. First, if a tax expenditure (or some other government program) is effective in encouraging
work or savings, repealing or limiting it can have the opposite effect. For example, if the EITC
successfully promotes work, scaling it back can induce some to leave the workforce. On the
other hand, if a tax expenditure is a complement to leisure, repealing or limiting it can encourage
work. For instance, if the tax-free treatment of workman’s compensation tempts claimants to
seek it even if they are able to work,105 repealing this tax benefit eliminates this temptation.
b. Base-Broadening to Cut Marginal Rates (or Keep them from Rising)
Second, even if a tax expenditure has no obvious connection to savings or work choices,
repealing or limiting it can still alter a taxpayer’s effective marginal rate. Even more than
average rates, marginal rates influence labor and savings decisions.106 A familiar rationale for
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repeal or limits, then, is to fund a cut in marginal rates (or to keep these rates from rising). This
effect does not stem from the limit itself, but from the way we use the savings it generates.
Obviously, it can arise with direct expenditures as well (e.g., if we cut government spending to
fund a marginal rate cut).
c. Bracket Creep
Third, repeal or a limit alters the effective marginal rate more directly by reducing a
taxpayer’s deductions or exclusions, and thus bumping her into a higher bracket.107 For
example, a taxpayer would be in the 25% bracket with $20,000 of deductions and $100,000 of
income, but would move to the 28% bracket upon losing $8000 of deductions (since the top of
the 25% bracket is $87,850). This Article calls this result “bracket creep,” analogizing to a
comparable effect of inflation. Bracket creep can affect anyone who is not already in the top
bracket. It arises in scaling back exclusions and deductions, but not credits (which offset tax
directly, instead of reducing taxable income). This effect arises with (some) tax expenditures,
but not with other government programs.
To eliminate bracket creep, we can “index” the bracket by raising its upper bound. For
example, if a limit disallows an average of $5,000 of deductions, we can raise the top of each
bracket by $5,000. Yet this remedy is imperfect, since those who lose less than $5,000 receive a
windfall, while those who lose more still experience some bracket creep.108
d. Income-Based Limits
Fourth, some limits change the effective marginal rate by tying the disallowance of tax
benefits to income. If earning more causes us to lose more deductions, exclusions, or credits, a
limit functions as a marginal rate increase. By contrast, if earning more entitles us to use more of
them, a limit reduces the effective rate. These changes in the effective tax rate are oblique
instead of explicit, so taxpayers who do not notice them may not change their behavior.109 Part
III analyzes seven types of limits to show which change the effective rate in this way, and which
do not. In principle, any government benefit or penalty tied to income could have this effect,
including direct expenditures (and fines) as well as tax expenditures.
e. Reduced Purchasing Power
Finally, scaling back a tax expenditure (or, indeed, any subsidy) also makes the favored
activity more expensive. For instance, taxpayers who used to deduct charitable contributions,
but no longer can, have to spend more after-tax dollars on them.110 This reduced purchasing
power weakens the incentive to work in some cases, but strengthens it in others. Someone
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whose main motive in working is to fund her favorite charity might be more tempted to retire.111
But someone who is already locked into a charitable pledge, which has become more expensive,
must earn more to honor it. If a subsidy is cut, people who were spending marginal dollars on
the subsidized activity – that is, dollars they might choose not to earn – are more likely to adjust
work choices than people who spend infra-marginal dollars.112 Likewise, heavy users of a
newly-limited tax expenditure obviously are affected more than light users. For example,
limiting the mortgage deduction could have no effect on renters (unless, of course, rent increases
as more want to rent). As a result, the magnitude (and even the direction) of these effects
vary.113
2. Effect on Administrative Costs and Planning
In addition to affecting labor and savings choices, repealing or limiting a tax expenditure
(or other government program) can also affect administrative costs and planning. On one hand,
if a tax expenditure adds significantly to these social costs, repealing or limiting it can reduce
them. For example, rampant fraud is a familiar reason to scale back a tax expenditure.114 On the
other hand, the limit itself can add to excess burden. It is another tax rule to be drafted,
understood and enforced, and also can prompt new planning strategies. Once again, the net
effect depends on the context. This subsection gives examples of how the five tightening
strategies discussed above can affect administrative costs and planning.
111
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a. Definitional Strategies
In defining the favored activity more precisely, we face a familiar tradeoff. A more
tailored tax expenditure (or other subsidy) focuses more effectively on high-value activities, but
is more challenging to draft. Enforcement and compliance may be costlier as well if the rule
requires taxpayers to keep careful records or apply nuanced distinctions. For instance, assume
we want to subsidize health care that creates positive externalities, but not care that yields only
private benefits. One option is to classify all types of care (e.g., covering vaccinations but not
cosmetic surgery). Alternatively, we can disallow a standard percentage of the deduction or
exclusion (a “haircut”) to approximate this effect, as we do with business entertainment. This
blunter approach is cheaper to administer, but is only approximately right at best.
b. Elasticity Strategies
A similar tradeoff arises in tailoring a tax expenditure (or other subsidy) to the claimant’s
responsiveness. Administrative costs increase, and planning may as well. For example, we can
disallow charitable deductions below a certain amount each year. This floor reduces record
keeping, and also avoids subsiding some contributions that would be made anyway.
Yet taxpayers can react by concentrating multi-year gifts into a single year. For example,
a taxpayer who earns $500,000 and gives $25,000 to charity each year would lose 20% of her
deduction ($5,000 of $25,000) if we impose a 1% floor. But if she gives $50,000 every other
year, she loses only 10% (5,000/50,000). She gives the same amount on average but cuts her
disallowed deductions in half.
This sort of “bunching” is less likely, though, when claimants do not fully control the
timing of their giving. For example, they may have to make a gift for a particular event, such as
a religious holiday or an annual dinner. It is likely, moreover, that some claimants will be less
rigorous about shifting their donations, and some nonprofits will be less accommodating. For
claimants who cannot move all their charity, there is less advantage to shifting any of it. For
instance, if the floor is $200 – and a claimant has at least $200 of charity that cannot be moved –
the floor no longer creates an incentive to shift other contributions. This is more likely to
happen, of course, when the floor is low.
Even for high floors, moreover, the motive to concentrate deductions is offset, to an
extent, by a counterveiling incentive to spread them more evenly: if “bunching” moves us to a
lower tax bracket, it reduces the value of some of our deductions. For example, assume a
married couple has $500,000 of income. If they claim $40,000 of deductions each year, they
remain in the 39.6% bracket (which governs taxable income above $457,100 in 2014). As a
result, all their deductions are worth 39.6 cents per dollar. But what if instead they claim
$80,000 in 2014 and no deductions in 2015? This “bunching’ moves them to the 35% bracket
(which governs taxable income above $405,100). As a result, over $37,000 of the deductions
they accelerate are worth only 35 cents per dollar (in reducing taxable income from $457,600 to
$420,000).115 This cost of “bunching “ arises only if a tax expenditure’s value varies with the tax
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bracket; as a result, it applies to deductions and exclusions, but not credits. The magnitude of
this cost depends on how steep the rate structure is, and also how close a claimant is to a lower
bracket. For instance, those earning $3,000,000 are unlikely to be affected, since they need to
“bunch” almost $2.5 million of deductions to move to a lower bracket.
c. Comparative Advantage Strategies
Just as tradeoffs arise in calibrating a subsidy to elasticity, they can arise also in targeting
claimants who use a tax expenditure (or other subsidy) most effectively. For example, sorting
with substantive criteria (e.g., based on weather or geography) can add to administrative costs,
since they have to be formulated and enforced. Using a competitive process can also be
expensive, since government personnel will be needed to run it and claimants will incur costs in
participating. In contrast, matching requirements (like the ones used for R&D and charity) are
simple to administer, once we set the right level for the match. Screening by income is also easy,
since the tax system has to measure income anyway.
d. Activity-Level Strategies
Imposing an overall or per-claimant cap on tax expenditures (or other subsidies) also can
add to administrative costs. Yet if we do not make this investment, the subsidy may not be
allocated as effectively. In some cases, administrative costs are not only the consequence of
varying the reimbursement rate, but also the cause. Tracking an expense (such as a charitable
contribution) could be cost-justified at a high level, but not a low level. This tradeoff will vary
for different tax expenditures. For example, it is probably easier to track low levels of mortgage
interest (usually paid to a single bank) than low levels of charity (often paid to multiple causes).
e. Bureaucratic Strategies
Finally, a familiar argument for converting tax expenditures to direct expenditures is
reducing administrative costs. Yet the argument is not persuasive if costs are merely shifted
within the government.116 Once again, the answer depends on the context. Administrative costs
rise if the tax system has to develop expertise that already exists elsewhere in government, but
not if the tax system already has the relevant expertise (e.g., in making income-based
judgments).117 Moreover, piggybacking on private sector judgments, as with R&D and charity,
does not require much substantive expertise.
*

*

*
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To sum up, then, a second goal in scaling back tax expenditures is reducing excess
burden (or, at least, minimizing increases). Effects on labor and savings choices, administrative
costs and planning are all important, and also context-specific. Sometimes our programmatic
and excess burden goals are compatible, but sometimes they are in tension.
D. Potential Tradeoff: Does Repealing or Limiting a Tax Expenditure
Undermine Distribution?
In repealing or limiting tax expenditures, we want to save money, preserve programmatic
benefits, and minimize excess burden. In assessing our progress on these dimensions, we have to
account for distribution. Effects on low-income taxpayers – both benefits and costs – are
especially significant because of the declining marginal utility of money. How much of a
premium we assign to their welfare depends on our social welfare function.118 To determine a
limit’s effect on distribution, we should consider three issues. First, who is helped (or hurt) by a
tax expenditure under current law? Second, how does the answer change if we limit the tax
expenditure in various ways? Third, if a limit has adverse distributional effects, can we
compensate by adjusting other aspects of the tax and transfer system? These issues are
considered in turn.
1. The Distributional Impact of Tax Expenditures Under Current Law
a. Tax Benefits for Most Tax Expenditures Flow Disproportionately to
High-Income Taxpayers
If a tax expenditure (or, indeed, any government program) disproportionately helps high
income taxpayers, scaling it back would enhance vertical equity. But how do we know who is
benefitting? One measure for tax expenditures, which is conventional but imperfect, focuses on
who claims the tax benefit. By this standard, high-income taxpayers are the clear winners for
most tax expenditures. For example, 80% of the tax benefit for itemized deductions went to the
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top 20% in 2011.119 Likewise, 2/3 of exclusions went to the top 20%, including employerprovided health insurance and investment income in retirement accounts.120
These tax benefits flow mostly to high-income taxpayers for four familiar reasons. The
first three apply only to tax expenditures, while the fourth could apply to other subsidies as well.
First, if taxpayers do not earn enough to owe income tax, a tax expenditure cannot reduce their
tax bill (unless it is refundable or applies to the payroll tax).121 Second, even among those who
pay income tax, only those who itemize (instead of claiming the standard deduction) are eligible
for some tax expenditures. This subset – less than one-third of filers in 2011 (38.4 million)122 –
tends to have higher incomes. Nearly half (18 million) had more than $100,000 of income, while
over 10% (4 million) had more than $200,000.123 Third, exclusions and deductions are more
valuable in a higher bracket. Excluding a dollar – that is, not paying tax on it – saves thirty-five
cents for someone taxed at 35%, but only twenty-five cents for someone taxed at 25%. This
“upside down effect” does not arise with credits, which reduce the tax itself instead of taxable
income (so a one-dollar credit reduces tax by one dollar).124 Finally, high income taxpayers tend
to spend more on subsidized expenses, such as health insurance, 401(k) plans, and mortgage
interest.125 For example, taxpayers earning over $200k averaged eight times more mortgage
interest than those earning between $40k and $50k in 2011 ($5,021 versus $642).126
If a tax expenditure disproportionately reduces the taxes of high income taxpayers,
limiting it usually raises their taxes. If the limit also enhances efficiency – for instance, by
offering more programmatic “bang for the buck” or reducing excess burden – it offers a unique
opportunity. Although efficiency and distribution are often in tension, here they would be
aligned.
b. Refundable Credits and Other Safety Net Tax Expenditures
Even so, distribution and efficiency sometimes are still in tension for two reasons. First,
some tax expenditures are claimed solely (or primarily) by low-income taxpayers, so that
limiting them would disproportionately affect this cohort. For example, the EITC is available
even to those who do not otherwise owe tax, as is the health coverage tax credit, the credit for
excess social security withholding, the “making work pay” credit, the homebuyer credit, and
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portions of the child credit and American opportunity credit (for college expenses).127 The
bottom 60% of taxpayers claimed 80% of tax benefits from refundable credits in 2011.128
Usually, refundable credits are justified as much by distribution as by externalities – and, in
some cases, more so. As a result, there is a strong case for keeping them if they are successful.
Yet even then, it would be better still to generate comparable distribution-based benefits at lower
cost, if we can.
c. Challenges in Measuring Incidence
Second, even if low income taxpayers are not the ones claiming a tax expenditure (or
other subsidy), they may still benefit economically from it, so that scaling it back is costly to
them. For example, when high-income taxpayers deduct charitable contributions for soup
kitchens or need-based scholarships, economic benefits flow to low-income people.129 Yet
charity to art museums or the opera is likely to have different distributional effects. Similarly,
although the tax benefit for municipal bond interest goes to (wealthy) bondholders, much of the
economic benefit goes to states (in reducing their borrowing costs). Likewise, while the
deduction for state and local taxes is claimed by high-income people, it can help states collect
more tax. For both of these tax expenditures, then, we need to know how states use the extra
money. Enhancing social services for low-income citizens obviously has different effects than
cutting property taxes on high end residences.
Needless to say, sometimes economic benefits actually do flow to the person claiming the
tax benefit. For instance, when a high income taxpayer deducts mortgage interest on a vacation
home in Vale or East Hampton, the government is funding private benefits for her (as well as
neighborhood-related externalities for a wealthy community). Likewise, gold-plated health plans
can provide private benefits to high income taxpayers.
Ultimately, then, we need to know a tax expenditure’s economic incidence to assess its
distributional impact.130 Unfortunately, this much harder than establishing who is claiming the
tax benefit. A rough guess may be the best we can do. Nevertheless, a rough answer to the right
question is more helpful than a precise answer to the wrong question. In deciding whether to
repeal or limit a tax expenditure, then, we need to consider whether low income taxpayers are its
main economic beneficiaries, even if they are not the ones claiming the tax benefit.
2. The Distributional Impact of the Limit
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Repealing a tax expenditure eliminates all the tax and economic benefits it provides. But
a limit eliminates only some of these benefits, affecting some claimants more than others. For
example, if we deny a tax expenditure to those earning more than $150,000, those earning less
can still claim the tax benefit. Sometimes this sort of disparity brings us closer to the distribution
we want, but sometimes it has the opposite effect. A context-specific analysis is needed to
determine a limit’s effect on distribution. This subsection offers examples drawn from the five
tightening strategies discussed above.
a. Definitional Strategies
One approach is to define favored conduct in a way that advances distributional goals.
For instance, some fringe benefits are subsidized only if offered to all employees. Including this
“nondiscrimination” rule in the relevant definition creates an incentive to cover low-income
employees, not just senior managers. Likewise, one subsidy for home ownership excludes gains
from selling a primary residence, but not a vacation home.131 This carveout is more likely to
burden high-income taxpayers. Notably, there is no similar exception for the mortgage interest
deduction. Adding one, as President Bush’s 2005 tax reform panel suggested, would save
money in a progressive way.132
In other cases, though, narrower definitions are an ineffective or costly way to pursue
distributional goals. For instance, although we might want to offer the charitable deduction only
to causes that help low-income beneficiaries, this would be difficult to administer. While soup
kitchens obviously qualify, and the opera probably does not, many causes are hard to classify.
Disaster relief, for example, is relevant to everyone, but can be especially important to lowincome people. In addition, what if a charity has some functions that qualify, and some that do
not? To deal with this, we could make separate judgments about each gift, depending on how it
is used. For instance, gifts to educational institutions would pass muster if they support financial
aid, but not professorships or building projects. Yet this approach founders on the fungibility of
money. After all, some gifts to financial aid do not actually increase the financial aid budget;
instead, they allow the school to allocate less tuition to financial aid, freeing up this revenue for
other initiatives. An alternative, then, is to treat all contributions as tax-advantaged, as long as a
sufficient percentage of the organization’s budget funds qualifying activities. But some
budgetary items would be hard to classify (e.g., the CEO’s salary or rent for the building), and
we would have to retest periodically. This approach also penalizes nonprofit “conglomerates”
that serve low-income populations while also pursuing other goals. In any event, the more
general point is that a more focused definition is an effective way to pursue distributional goals
in some settings, but not others. Once again, the context matters.
b. Elasticity Strategies
The same is true when we tighten a tax expenditure by favoring claimants who are most
responsive. High-income claimants usually are easier to influence because they have more
capacity in their budgets, as noted above. While this is a reason to allocate a subsidy primarily to
them, distributional goals are undercut if the subsidy offers them private benefits (as with
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subsidized vacation homes and “gold plated” health insurance) or creates externalities that do not
benefit low-income people (as with charity to the opera). Even so, there is no tradeoff if the
externalities benefit everyone (as with solar panels) or especially benefit low-income citizens (as
with charity to soup kitchens). In these cases, focusing on elasticity can improve distribution by
enabling the program to help low-income people more efficiently.
c. Comparative Advantage Strategies
Similarly, there is no one-size-fits-all answer when we favor claimants who can use a
subsidy most effectively. If a claimant’s comparative advantage derives from financial need (as
when we subsidize retirement savings to promote self-sufficiency), favoring this claimant
advances distributional goals. Yet in other cases, there can be a tradeoff with distribution. For
instance, what if a claimant’s comparative advantage derives from expertise, as with an R&D
subsidy? Distributional goals are still advanced if the subsidy generates positive externalities for
everyone (e.g., in curing a disease), but can be undercut if the subsidy generates private benefits
for experts with high incomes (e.g., in raising the pay of medical researchers). The economic
incidence of the tax expenditure obviously is important, and it varies with the context.
d. Activity-Level Strategies
We also encounter this sort of context-specific variability in calibrating how much to
subsidize each claimant. Sometimes this sort of fine tuning advances distributional goals. For
example, we might decide to cap a subsidy for health insurance because low-income claimants
rarely have gold-plated policies. Indeed, if distribution is our priority, we might prefer to phase
out the subsidy instead of capping it, so only low-income claimants are eligible. In other cases,
however, a per-claimant cap or phaseout would undercut distributional goals. This would be the
case with charity supporting soup kitchens, as well as with other tax expenditures that generates
positive externalities for low-income people (instead of private benefits for high-income
claimants).
e. Bureaucratic Strategies
Finally, we see the same variation in deciding whether to use a tax expenditure or a direct
expenditure. For example, a familiar disadvantage of pursuing distributional goals with tax
expenditures is the “upside down” effect: deductions and exclusions offer more generous tax
benefits in higher brackets (although refundable credits avoid this issue). In addition, the tax
system sometimes is less effective in imposing distribution-based conditions on how money is
used. For instance, if the federal government wants to fund states programs for low-income
citizens, the deduction for state income tax offers less control than block grants. Nevertheless,
the tax system has a notable advantage in pursuing distributional goals: a sophisticated capacity
to measure income and dispense money.133
3. Compensating Adjustments
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Zelinsky, supra note 95, at 1010 (“Tax incentives efficiently communicate government policies through an
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To sum up, then, it is important to account for distribution when we consider scaling back
tax expenditures. In some cases, distribution justifies the limit (e.g., if a tax expenditure
disproportionately benefits high-income people). In other cases, distribution is a reason not to
impose a limit, or at least is a cost to be managed (e.g., if a tax expenditure helps low-income
people, but in a costly or inefficient way). In other words, sometimes efficiency and
distributional goals align, but sometimes they are in tension.
When there is a tradeoff, a familiar way to manage it is to adopt a limit that promotes
efficiency, while advancing distribution another way. For example, assume we want to limit the
earned income tax credit to keep claimants from committing fraud, but this limit would undercut
distribution by also affecting honest claimants. To offset this distributional cost, we can pair the
limit with a payroll tax cut for low income taxpayers. As a result, we achieve the distribution we
want – or at least approximate it – in a more efficient way.
Unfortunately, this sort of offsetting distributional adjustment is not always feasible.
Some involve efficiency costs of their own, while others are politically unattainable. When an
offsetting adjustment is not available, it becomes more important to accommodate distribution
within the four corners of the limit. In managing this sort of tradeoff, we should compare
different types of limits and choose the one that enhances welfare the most, once all the
competing factors are considered.
III.

Floors, Caps, and Fractions: Seven Limits and the Tradeoffs They Involve

To determine what offsetting adjustments we need, or to select the limit that enhances
welfare the most on its own, we have to understand the tradeoffs inherent in each limit. This Part
analyzes seven types of limits: fixed-dollar floors; income-based floors; fixed-dollar caps;
income-based caps; phaseouts; maximum fractions; and haircuts. Each modifies the marginal
reimbursement rate in a different way. As a result, they have varying effects on programmatic
incentives, excess burden, and distribution, and thus involve different tradeoffs. Some are
especially useful for activity-level strategies, while others are a good fit for elasticity strategies.
Again, there is no one-size-fits-all answer, so context-specific analysis is critical.
A. Fixed-Dollar Floors
One option is to use a floor, which keeps a tax expenditure from supporting low levels of
favored activity. A “fixed dollar” floor defines this level as a fixed amount (instead of a
percentage of income). For example, we can subsidize charitable contributions only to the extent
they exceed $500.134
1. Programmatic Benefits

134

The standard deduction is also a fixed-dollar floor.
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A floor eliminates programmatic incentives for activity below the minimum level, but
preserves them above this level. With a $500 floor, for instance, a taxpayer is subsidized for
increasing charitable giving from $500 to $1,000,135 but not from 0 to $500.
In preserving programmatic incentives for high activity levels, fixed-dollar floors offer
two advantages. First, they focus the subsidy on these higher levels. As a result, fixed-dollar
floors are well suited to aggregate subsidies that encourage as much activity as possible, without
regard to who is engaging in it (e.g., green energy and charity). Second, floors help avoid
subsidizing what the taxpayer would do anyway. If most people give at least $500 to charity
without a subsidy, a $500 floor concentrates the subsidy where it is more likely to change
behavior. Thus, a floor is a good fit for elasticity strategies. Picking the right level is a
challenge, though, since one that is marginal for some is too high (or low) for others.
While a floor is well suited to these goals, it is a poor fit for motivating the first dollar of
spending. Subsidizing low activity levels is essential in encouraging everyone to commit at least
a minimum amount to retirement savings, health insurance, or some other favored activity.
These individually-based subsidies need to motivate claimants who otherwise would spend
nothing (or very little). Floors keep subsidies from reaching these people.
2. Excess Burden
Floors have the further disadvantage of increasing planning costs. As noted above, they
encourage taxpayers to concentrate multi-year spending into a single tax year (e.g., giving
charity every other year). This strategy can reduce the amount disallowed by the floor.136 Even
so, floors can reduce compliance costs. As noted above, those who spend less than the floor do
not need to keep records.
3. Distribution
Just as fixed-dollar floors have mixed effects on programmatic incentives and excess
burden, they also can affect distribution in different ways. To help low-income people, we
sometimes have to subsidize the first dollar. This can be important, for instance, in encouraging
them to save for retirement or buy health insurance. The first dollar is more likely to be marginal
for low-income claimants than high-income ones, who usually take these steps on their own. In
this sort of “self-sufficiency” initiative, then, a floor can disproportionately exclude low-income
claimants. More generally, a fixed-dollar floor is likely to be more daunting to low-income
claimants than high income ones. Given the diminishing marginal utility of money, committing
a fixed amount of money is harder for those who earn less.
Yet this is a problem only if low-income people have to claim a subsidy in order to
benefit from it. This is not the case with charity for soup kitchens, for instance, or with some
environmental initiatives. If a tax expenditure creates externalities that benefit low-income
people – even when they are not the ones claiming it – a floor can generate these externalities
more efficiently, thereby enhancing distribution.
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Cf. Deena Ackerman & Gerald Auten, Floors, Ceilings, and Opening the Door for a Non-Itemizer Deduction,59
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See supra Part II.C.2.
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4. Tradeoffs
To sum up, then, fixed-dollar floors can be appealing when our goal is to encourage as
much favored activity as possible (e.g., green energy or charity). These floors offer more
programmatic “bang for the buck” by not funding (some) infra-marginal activity. They also can
reduce record-keeping burdens. However, fixed-dollar floors are not at all tailored to
heterogeneity. They will be too high for some claimants and too low for others. A further
disadvantage is that they can encourage taxpayers to consolidate multi-year spending into a
single year.137 In addition, we should not use fixed-dollar floors when the goal is to encourage at
least a minimum level of favored activity (e.g., ensuring that everyone has health insurance), and
also in other contexts where the participation of low-income claimants is important.
Table 1: Fixed-Dollar Floors
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Valuable Externalities
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Diminishing Returns
Benefits for Essential First Dollar
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants
Excess Burden
Increased Complexity
Increased Cost for Favored Activity
Bracket Creep
Disguised Rate Increase
Spreading
Bunching
Distribution
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income
3rd Parties

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes

B. Income-Based Floors
Instead of defining a floor as a fixed amount, we can define it as a percentage of the
taxpayer’s income (an “income-based floor”). For example, we can limit the charitable
deduction to contributions above 1% of AGI, as President Bush’s tax reform panel suggested.138
While income-based floors share most of the advantages and disadvantages of fixed-dollar
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Ackerman & Auten, supra note 21, at 513; Louis Kaplow, The Standard Deduction and Floors in the Income
Tax, 50 TAX L. REV. 1 (1994)at 27 (arguing that it is easy to “bunch” payments when we control the timing of them,
so that charity is easier to “bunch” than mortgage interest).
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Bush Tax Panel, supra, at 75.
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floors, they are somewhat more effective at accommodating elasticity and pursuing distributional
goals. Nevertheless, they have the offsetting disadvantage of increasing the effective marginal
rate.
1. Programmatic Incentives
Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors maintain programmatic incentives above
the floor. In so doing, they are more effective in accounting for elasticity. When we estimate
how much a claimant would give to charity without a subsidy, for example, a percentage of
income is more reliable than a fixed dollar amount. After all, a $500 floor is probably too high
for someone earning $30,000 and too low for someone earning $1,000,000. One percent of
income is likely to be closer to the mark for each ($300 and $10,000, respectively). As a result,
income-based floors are a good choice for encouraging as much activity as possible, without
regard to who is engaging in it (e.g., green energy and charity). They also share a key limitation
of fixed-dollar floors: both are a poor choice for encouraging everyone to engage in at least a
minimum level of favored activity (e.g., retirement savings and health insurance).
2. Excess Burden
With one important difference, income-based floors have the same effects on excess
burden as fixed-dollar floors. On the positive side of the ledger, they eliminate some recordkeeping. On the negative side, both encourage taxpayers to “bunch” multi-year spending into a
single year.
Yet income-based floors have a disadvantage that fixed-dollar floors do not share: when
claimants earn more money, they lose more of the tax expenditure. For example, the Pease rule
increases the effective marginal rate in this way. Although this provision often is described as a
phaseout, it actually is an income-based floor.139 Taxpayers lose 3 cents of itemized deductions
for every dollar of income they earn above a threshold ($300,000 for an individual).140 For
taxpayers in the 39.6 bracket, losing 3 cents of deductions costs 1.2 cents (3*.396). This is a
1.2% increase in the effective marginal rate.141 A 1% floor on charitable deductions has a similar
effect. An additional one hundred dollars of earnings eliminates one dollar of deductions,
thereby increasing tax by 39.6 cents, and thus increasing the effective marginal rate by .396%
(for those in the 39.6% bracket). By contrast, fixed-dollar floors do not disallow more
deductions as taxpayers earn more. A $500 floor remains $500, even if the taxpayer’s income
increases.142
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See, e.g., Altshuler & Dietz, supra note 33.
A taxpayer cannot lose more than 80% of her itemized deductions, so that someone with very few itemized
deductions might not be governed by the 3% rule.
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Manning & Andress, supra note 23, at 1602 (“[A]lthough called an overall limitation, the provision is basically
an addition to the marginal rate above the threshold amount at 3 percent times the otherwise applicable rate . . .,
approximately a 1.2 percentage point increase in the marginal rate in the 39.6 percent bracket (3 percent x 39.6
percent.”); Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 18.
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Even so, a fixed-dollar floor can weaken work incentives by reducing the purchasing-power of marginal earnings,
as discussed above. See supra Part II.C.1.b. For example, assume someone wants to use her last dollar of earnings
to contribute to charity, but a floor disallows this deduction. In this case, the purchasing power of this marginal
dollar of earnings – and thus the return to working more – is reduced.
140
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Of course, income-based floors increase the marginal rate in this way only when
taxpayers actually have deductions to lose. Someone whose charitable giving is above the floor
is affected, but someone who has not made any gift to charity is not. Earning an extra dollar
would not affect how many deductions the latter can claim.143
3. Distribution
Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors have mixed effects on distribution. On one
hand, when a tax expenditure creates externalities that benefit low-income people, such as
charity for soup kitchens, an income-based floor can help it to do so more efficiently. On the
other hand, when a tax expenditure is supposed to encourage low-income people to spend their
first dollar on favored conduct, such as health insurance or retirement savings, a floor can be
counterproductive.
While the distributional implications of both types of floors are similar, they are not the
same. There is a difference when the participation of low-income taxpayers is normatively
important. In those cases, income-based floors have an advantage in not using the same floor for
everyone. After all, giving more than $500 to charity is harder for someone earning $30,000
than someone earning $1,000,000, as noted above. Yet although an income-based floor is better,
it does not solve the problem entirely. Given the diminishing marginal utility of money,
contributing 1% is harder for low-income claimants. In response, we could further reduce the
floor for those with low incomes (e.g., .5% for those earning $100,000 or less, and 1% for those
earning more). Yet as is often the case, solving one problem compounds another: Increasing the
percentage with income in this way creates a bulge in the effective marginal rate. For example,
if the floor is .5% for those earning $100,000 and 1% for those earning more, earning a dollar
more than $100,000 increases the floor by $500. This means a one dollar increase in income
(from $100,000 to $100,001) can increase the tax bill by $140.144 Alternatively, if the increase
from .5% to 1% is phased in over a range, there would be a series of smaller bulges.145 Again,
though, this is an issue only when the participation of low-income claimants is normatively
important.
4. Tradeoffs
Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors are helpful in encouraging as much favored
activity as possible (as with green energy and charity), and in reducing record-keeping burdens.
These floors offer more programmatic “bang for the buck” by not funding (some) infra-marginal
activity – indeed, they are better than fixed-dollar floors on this dimension.
Yet these programmatic advantages must be balanced against effects on excess burden.
Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors encourage taxpayers to consolidate multi-year
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In addition, an income-based floor can also weaken work incentives by reducing a taxpayer’s purchasing-power,
as discussed above. See supra Part II.C.1.b. For example, if someone wants to contribute her last dollar of earnings
to charity, but the floor disallows this deduction, the purchasing power of this marginal dollar of earnings is reduced.
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The floor increases from $500 to $1000.10. In 2014, a single person earnings $100,000 has a (stated) marginal
rate of 28%, so that losing $500 of deductions increases tax by $140.
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For example, if we increase the floor by .1 at five different points (one of which is $100,000), then going from
$100,000 to $100,001 increases the floor by $100, and thus increases tax by $28.
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spending into a single year.146 In addition, income-based floors increase the effective marginal
rate in a way that fixed-dollar floors do not, further sharpening the tradeoff between
programmatic benefits and excess burden. In any event, the programmatic advantages do not
arise – so that income-based floors are a poor fit – when our goal is to encourage at least a
minimum level of favored activity (e.g., ensuring that everyone saves for retirement, has health
insurance, etc.).
Table 2: Income-Based Floors
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Valuable Externalities
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Diminishing Returns
Benefits for Essential First Dollar
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants
Excess Burden
Increased Complexity
Increased Cost for Favored Activity
Bracket Creep
Disguised Rate Increase
Spreading
Bunching
Distribution
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income
3rd Parties

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes

C. Fixed-Dollar Caps
The mirror image of a floor is a cap, which imposes a maximum on how much claimants
can claim. Caps can be defined as a fixed dollar amount, as when Governor Romney proposed a
$25,000 cap on itemized deductions. Unlike floors, caps subsidize the first dollar of spending,
but (potentially) not the last dollar. As a result, caps have quite different uses than floors.
1. Programmatic Incentives
A fixed-dollar cap preserves programmatic incentives below the cap, while eliminating
them above it. Therefore, they are useful for encouraging at least a minimum level of favored
activity, but not more. For example, a cap on the exclusion for employer-provided health
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insurance enables us to subsidize basic health insurance, but not gold-plated policies.147 This
increases the subsidy’s bang for the buck if basic insurance generates externalities, but goldplating yields mostly private benefits, as discussed above. If marginal positive externalities also
decline for retirement savings and home ownership subsidies, caps are useful for them as well.
Not surprisingly, then, fixed dollar caps already govern retirement savings and the health
insurance exclusion (indirectly, through the “Cadillac tax”). Likewise, mortgage interest is
deductible only for mortgages of $1 million or less. Needless to say, the cap for each tax
expenditure should be different, since the relevant externalities are different.
Yet although caps can be a good fit for individualized subsidies, they are not a good fit
for aggregate subsidies, such as charity or green energy. Since they eliminate programmatic
incentives above the cap, they do not encourage as much favored activity as possible, regardless
of who engages in it. They also are not a good fit for elasticity strategies, since they do not deny
the subsidy – or, at least, the first dollar of it – to those who would engage in favored activity
anyway.
The level of the cap depends on context-specific factors, such as the rate of decline in
marginal externalities. This means it is likely to vary for different tax expenditures. We will not
successfully account for these differences if we apply the same cap to each tax expenditure – or,
for that matter, a single “basket” cap to limit a group of them.
2. Excess Burden
Fixed-dollar caps can exacerbate excess burden by increasing compliance and
enforcement costs. Taxpayers have to understand and comply with these limits and the
government must police them. In addition, these caps can encourage taxpayers to shift expenses
from one year to another, where there is still capacity in the cap. For instance, assume the sum
of all itemized deductions cannot exceed $25,000, and a taxpayer earning $200,000 owes
$12,000 in state tax. Since she has only $13,000 of capacity left to deduct mortgage interest and
charity, she has reason to defer some charity until she has paid off the mortgage. This sort of
“spreading” is the mirror image of the “bunching” triggered by floors.
While fixed-dollar caps share this problem with floors (or, at least, a variation of it), they
avoid another: Unlike income-based floors, fixed dollar caps do not disallow more deductions as
taxpayers earn more. After all, Governor Romney’s cap remains $25,000, whether someone
earns $50,000 or $150,000. As a result, fixed-dollar caps do not increase the effective marginal
rate in the same way.
Even so, fixed-dollar caps can still affect work incentives in some cases. By disallowing
deductions, caps can push taxpayers into a higher bracket. In addition, caps can reduce the
returns to working, as measured by after-tax purchasing power. If someone has delayed
retirement in order to keep supporting her favorite charity, as noted above, she may stop working
if her charitable deduction is capped. Yet a cap can also strengthen work incentives in some
cases. For example, if someone has already committed to a charitable gift, she has to earn more
to cover the increased (after-tax) cost of this pledge. These effects vary depending on whether
147
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claimants are heavy users of the relevant tax expenditure, and whether they devote marginal
earnings to it148 High income taxpayers are more susceptible to this effect, since they spend
more on tax-favored expenses, such charity, mortgage interest, and state taxes.
3. Distribution
For this reason, a fixed-dollar cap is more likely to take away tax benefits from highincome taxpayers than low-income taxpayers. For example, a $25,000 cap on itemized
deductions is a tight constraint for someone earning $1,000,000, but is unlikely to disallow any
deductions for someone earning $60,000. This is a tax increase almost exclusively for highincome taxpayers. Yet if we focus on the economic benefits provided by the tax expenditure,
instead of the tax benefits, the assessment becomes more complex. For instance, if a cap
discourages a high-income taxpayer from donating to a soup kitchen, its clientele is also affected.
4. Tradeoffs
Caps are extremely appealing when low activity levels generate externalities, but higher
levels do not add much. In these cases, caps save money while foreclosing only modest
externalities. They also make the tax system more progressive, at least if we focus on tax
burdens instead of economic benefits. Although caps can add to compliance costs and planning,
they do not increase marginal rates in the same way that income-based floors do. As a result,
caps can offer a “grand slam” for tax expenditures whose marginal benefits decline as activity
levels rise. This might be the case, for instance, for health insurance, mortgage interest, and
retirement savings, as discussed above. Yet caps are less helpful when the goal is to encourage
as much favored activity as possible, since they eliminate programmatic incentives above the
cap. They also do not help us avoid subsidizing what claimants would do anyway.
Table 3: Fixed-Dollar Caps
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Valuable Externalities
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Diminishing Returns
Benefits for Essential First Dollar
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants
Excess Burden
Increased Complexity
Increased Cost for Favored Activity
Bracket Creep
Disguised Rate Increase
Spreading
Bunching
Distribution
148

No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

See supra Part II.C.1.e.
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Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income
3rd Parties

Yes
No
No

D. Income-Based Caps
Instead of a fixed amount, a cap can be defined as a percentage of income (an “incomebased cap”). For example, current law limits charitable deductions to 30% (or in some cases
50%) of AGI.149
1. Programmatic Incentives
Income-based caps offer largely the same programmatic costs and benefits as fixed-dollar
caps. Since they eliminate programmatic incentives above the cap, they are a poor fit for
encouraging as much activity as possible. In subsidizing the first dollar of favored activity, they
risk subsidizing what claimants would do anyway. Yet like fixed-dollar caps, income-based caps
are useful for subsidizing a minimum level of favored activity, but not more.
A notable difference, though, is that income-based caps are less effective when a fixed
dollar amount is the most precise way to specify the targeted level. For example, if the goal is to
subsidize basic (but not gold-plated) health insurance, we should reference the price of an
average premium. Since this price represents a different percentage of income for each claimant,
an income-based cap is a blunt way to target this level.
Yet income-based caps have an offsetting advantage. At least to an extent, they are
automatically indexed for inflation (since incomes rise with inflation), as well as for regional
variation (since income correlates with regional costs of living). This is not a trivial advantage.
After all, if we use the average 2014 premium as a fixed dollar cap for health insurance, but do
not adjust it for inflation, the cap becomes too low over time. Likewise, if we use the same
fixed-dollar cap for the entire nation, it will be too low in some places and too high in others.150
While this problem can be fixed with indexation, income-based caps have the virtue of not
requiring this remedy.
2. Excess Burden
Income-based caps have another advantage not shared by fixed-dollar caps: they reduce
the effective marginal rate, since earning more frees up more deductions. For instance, if
itemized deductions are capped at 10% of AGI, a taxpayer with $500,000 of income can deduct
only $50,000. Earning an extra dollar increases deductions by 10 cents, reducing tax by 3.96
cents in the top bracket. This cuts the effective marginal rate by 3.96% (from 39.6% to
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Or the cap can be defined in terms of the tax benefit, rather than the favored expenditure, as Martin Feldstein
has proposed. Feldstein, supra note 7.
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Cf. Joseph P. Newhouse, Variations in Health Care Spending: Target Decisionmaking, Not Geography, Institute
of Medicine of the National Academies (2013), http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=18393 (confirming
that health care costs vary substantially by region).
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35.64%).151 In this way, income-based caps are the mirror image of income-based floors, which
increase the effective marginal rate, as noted above. As a result, income-based caps have the
added advantage of potentially mitigating labor and savings distortions. Otherwise, they have
the same effect on excess burden as fixed-dollar caps. They increase compliance and
enforcement costs. Both also can induce a taxpayer to shift expenses from one year to another,
as discussed above.
3. Distribution
While fixed-dollar caps are tighter constraints on high-income claimants than low-income
claimants, as noted above, this is not necessarily true of income-based caps. Although high–
income claimants spend a larger absolute amount on tax-favored expenses, do they spend a
larger percentage of their income? They probably do in some cases (e.g., state income tax), but
not in others (e.g., health insurance). In addition, we should focus not only on tax benefits
generated by the tax expenditure, but also on economic benefits. Again, if a cap keeps highincome donors from supporting a soup kitchen, the low-income clientele is affected as well.
4. Tradeoffs
Like fixed-dollar caps, income-based caps are useful when marginal programmatic
benefits decline as the activity level rises. They save money while eliminating programmatic
incentives that are not especially valuable (although probably in a less precise way than fixeddollar caps). They reduce effective marginal rates (something that fixed-dollar caps do not do),
and may also make the tax system more progressive, at least if we focus on tax benefits instead
of on economic benefits. As a result, income-based caps can offer a “grand slam” for tax
expenditures whose marginal benefits decline as activity levels rise. Depending on the empirics,
this could be true of the health insurance, retirement savings, and mortgage interest examples
discussed above.
Yet like fixed-dollar caps, income-based caps are less helpful when the goal is to
encourage as much favored activity as possible, since they eliminate programmatic incentives
above the cap. They also do not help us avoid subsidizing what claimants would do anyway.
Table 4: Income-Based Caps
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Valuable Externalities
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Diminishing Returns
Benefits for Essential First Dollar
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants

No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Even so, an income-based cap can weaken work incentives by reducing the purchasing-power of marginal
earnings, as discussed above. See supra Part II.C.1.b. For example, assume someone wants to use their last dollar
of earnings to contribute to charity, but the cap disallows this deduction. In this case, the purchasing power of this
marginal dollar of earnings – and thus the return to working more – is reduced.
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Excess Burden
Increased Complexity
Increased Cost for Favored Activity
Bracket Creep
Disguised Rate Increase
Spreading
Bunching
Distribution
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income
3rd Parties

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No

E. Phaseouts and Cliffs
Phaseouts and cliffs deny tax benefits to those who earn more than a minimum amount.
The disallowance occurs all at once with a cliff, and over a range with a phaseout. Under current
law, phaseouts apply to the earned income-tax credit, child credit, Roth IRAs, and various
education credits.
1. Programmatic Incentives
These limits preserve programmatic incentives for taxpayers with sufficiently low
incomes, while eliminating them for everyone else. As a result, phaseouts and cliffs avoid
subsidizing what (some) claimants would do anyway. High-income claimants need less
encouragement to enter the workforce, seek an education, and save for retirement. Excluding
these claimants can focus the subsidy where it has the most impact. Indeed, when the goal is to
encourage at least a minimum level of favored activity (e.g., so claimants become selfsufficient), a phaseout can be paired with a cap, as with education subsidies, the EITC, and Roth
IRAs under current law.
At the same time, phaseouts and cliffs are not a good fit for maximizing the volume of
activity, without regard to who engages in it. For instance, phasing out the charitable deduction
for high-earners would significantly reduce charitable giving, since these donors have more
capacity to give and are more responsive to financial incentives.
2. Excess Burden
Phaseouts and cliffs also increase the effective marginal tax rate.152 Earning more causes
taxpayers to lose deductions, exclusions, or credits.153 The EITC thus creates offsetting
incentives: the credit itself encourages work, but the phaseout has the opposite effect.

152

Manning & Andress, supra note 23, at 1592 (“A phase-out of a deduction is effectively the same as an
adjustment of the tax rate for those otherwise entitled to the deduction.”).
153
Daniel N. Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low-Income Households, 84 TAX NOTES 1191, 1196 (Aug.
23, 1999) (estimating effective marginal rate of over 100% in increasing income from $10,000 to $25,000, given
phaseout of various state and federal welfare and other benefits, such as Medicaid, the EITC, Temporary Aid to
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3. Distribution
Even so, phaseouts and cliffs can promote distributional goals, especially when tax
expenditures generate mostly private benefits. For instance, since the EITC is supposed to help
claimants, a phaseout enhances distribution by ensuring they actually need this assistance. In
contrast, the charitable deduction helps third-party beneficiaries more than claimants. When
these beneficiaries have low incomes, phasing out this subsidy is a counterproductive way to
pursue distributional goals.
4. Tradeoffs
Phaseouts and cliffs offer a familiar tradeoff between programmatic benefits and
distribution, on one hand, and excess burden, on the other. These limits permit precise incomebased allocations. This can focus the subsidy where it does the most good, especially when
subsidies generate private benefits. For these individually-based tax expenditures, the main
disadvantage is that phaseouts and cliffs increase effective marginal rates. They also are a poor
fit for aggregate subsidies that increase the overall amount of favored activity, without regard to
who engages in it.
Table 5: Phaseouts and Cliffs
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Valuable Externalities
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Diminishing Returns
Benefits for Essential First Dollar
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants
Excess Burden
Increased Complexity
Increased Cost for Favored Activity
Bracket Creep
Disguised Rate Increase
Spreading
Bunching
Distribution
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants

Yes (in theory)154
Yes (in theory)
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

Needy Families, food stamps, and rent subsidies); Manning & Andress, supra note 23, at 1593 (“Because all
exemptions are phased out simultaneously, possibly reflecting the practical difficulties of doing it seriatim with such
a large rante, this process also has the perverse effect that the larger the family, the harder the marginal rate
throughout the phaseout range. Talk about negative family values.”); id at 1598 (“to the extent high tax rates
discourage work, the EITC phase-out may have a perverse effect”).
154
A phaseout becomes a tighter constraint as income rises, but not as activity level rises. On their own, then,
phaseouts do not limit the amount of activity that is subsidized. But they usually are paired with caps, so it is rare
for a tax expenditure that is subject to a phaseout to support an unlimited level of activity. Even if they did,
moreover, the low-income of the claimant would itself constrain how much favored activity is feasible.
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Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income
3rd Parties

Yes
No

F. Maximum Fraction
Another option is to fund an unlimited amount of the favored activity, but at a lower rate.
For example, although the taxpayer’s marginal rate usually defines the government’s share of
deductions and exclusions, President Obama has proposed a maximum of 28% (“a maximum
fraction”).
1. Programmatic Incentives
This proposal affects only those in brackets above 28%. It weakens their programmatic
incentives, but does not eliminate them. A key question is whether this reduced rate induces the
desired level of favored activity. The answer varies with the context. All else being equal, the
rate should be higher when activities generate more externalities. At the same time, it should be
lower when claimants are more responsive to tax incentives.
A flaw in the Obama proposal, then, is that 28% is unlikely to be right for all tax
expenditures. Current law has a similar flaw in using the marginal tax rate as the reimbursement
rate (for deductions and exclusions).155 There is no reason why the marginal tax rate (or 28%
percent) always would be optimal.156 Instead, we should use different rates for mortgage
interest, health insurance, charity, and other subsidies.157 To do so, we can use credits with rates
tailored to the context. Admittedly, this approach has its own problems. This tailoring raises
administrative costs. The government may also not have the expertise to distinguish among
different subsidies, and will face intense lobbying in doing so. Yet even if the result is not
perfect, there is room to improve on current law.
A further downside is that a maximum fraction accords the same treatment to the first and
last dollar spent on favored activity, even if the relevant elasticities or externalities vary. As a
result, this limit is more likely than a floor to subsidize what claimants would do anyway (such
as the first dollar of charity). Unlike a cap, it subsidizes an unlimited amount of favored activity,
which is undesirable when marginal externalities decline (as with gold-plated health insurance).
2. Excess Burden
155

Admittedly, there might be some correlation. For instance, tax sensitive people may be more responsive not only
in their labor supply decisions, but also in their use of tax expenditures. Cf. Joel Slemrod & Wojciech Kopczuk, The
Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income 84 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (2002) (positing that elasticity may be controllable
instead of a pure preference). If all else were equal, then, we would want lower rates – both tax rates and subsidy
rates – for those who are especially tax sensitive. Yet even for them, we should be concerned that elasticities of
labor supply differ from those for subsidized activities, such that the rates should be different.
156
See Saez, supra note 12, at 2659 (“There is no theoretical reason to link the subsidy rate on the contribution good
to the income tax rate as is currently done in the US income tax code.”). Batchelder, Goldberg, Orszag, supra note
8, at 28 (“It is extremely unlikely that externalities and elasticities change in an abrupt and discontinuous fashion
exactly at the point of zero income tax liability or the marginal tax rate thresholds.”).
157
In other work, I have discussed the potential advantages of this approach for charitable subsidies. Schizer,
Subsidizing Charitable Contributions, supra note 17.
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Like other limits, a maximum fraction can complicate the calculation of tax liability,
although tax preparation software alleviates this cost. Even so, a maximum fraction has an
advantage over caps and floors: it does not create an incentive to shift spending from one year to
another. Under the Obama proposal, each dollar of deductions is worth 28 cents, whether we
concentrate two years of deductions into a single year or spread them evenly across both years.
In other words, a maximum fraction avoids the “bunching” and “spreading” associated with
floors and caps.158
A maximum fraction differs from caps and floors in another respect as well: it does not
disallow (or authorize) more deductions as claimant earns more. For instance, by earning
another dollar, and thus moving from the 28% bracket to the 33% bracket, claimants do not lose
any deductions. As a result, a maximum fraction does not change the effective marginal rate in
the way that income-based floors and caps do. Yet a maximum fraction obviously makes some
deductions less valuable than they otherwise would be. As a result, this limit increases the cost
of previously-subsidized consumption.159 It also imposes a form of bracket creep, since
claimants can no longer use itemized deductions to avoid moving from the 28% bracket to the
33% bracket.160
3. Distribution
A maximum fraction can enhance distribution by offering a more uniform tax benefit to
claimants with different incomes. Under President Obama’s proposal, for instance, claimants in
the 28% bracket receive the same tax benefit as claimants in higher brackets. Put another way, a
maximum fraction disallows more tax benefits for those in higher bracket (e.g., the Obama
proposal disallows 11.6% in the 39.6% bracket, but only 7% in the 35% bracket). Even so,
claimants in lower brackets still receive a less generous tax benefit. A dollar of deductions is
still worth 15 cents to claimants the 15% bracket, but its value becomes the same 28 cents for
claimants in the 28%, 35% and 39.6% brackets. As a result, the “upside down effect” is
mitigated but not eliminated.
158

For similar reasons, it also avoids the incentive to “spread,” discussed above, that can arise even without a cap:
“bunching” can move claimants to a lower bracket, thereby reducing the value of deductions or exclusions. Yet the
Obama proposal eliminates this issue for claimants in the top three brackets. Whether they stay in their current
bracket or move to a lower one, their deductions and exclusions are still worth 28%. This value declines only if they
move to a bracket below 28%.
159

For example, if someone wants to use their last dollar of earnings to pay mortgage interest, but a maximum
fraction reduces the tax benefit, the purchasing power of this marginal dollar of earnings – and thus the return to
working more – is reduced. See supra Part II.C.1.b.
160
Taxpayers have to determine their tax bracket based on their income before they subtract their itemized
deductions (i.e., using adjusted gross income instead of taxable income). For example, since the 33% bracket
applies to income above $183,250, consider a taxpayer who has an adjusted gross income (“AGI”) of exactly this
$183,250 amount, and also has $10,000 of itemized deductions. Under current law, an additional dollar of earnings
is still taxed at 28%. The reason is that brackets are not applied to AGI (the pre-deduction amount), but to taxable
income (i.e., AGI minus itemized deductions). This means deductions can keep taxpayers from moving up to the
33% bracket: AGI is 183,251, but taxable income (i.e., AGI minus $10,000 of itemized deductions) is only
$173,251. As a result, a dollar of deductions is reducing tax by 33 cents – something that President Obama’s
proposal does not allow. Instead of applying the brackets after subtracting deductions, we would apply the brackets
to AGI, calculate the tax, and then separately subtract an amount equal to 28% of the itemized deductions (28% of
10,000 or 2800).
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Again, the distributional analysis becomes more complicated if we focus on economic
benefits, instead of tax benefits. By cutting the reimbursement rate, maximum fractions can
reduce the volume of favored activity. This has an adverse effect on low-income third parties
who benefit from it (e.g., charity to soup kitchens).
4. Tradeoffs
A maximum fraction is, in a sense, a compromise between floors and caps. Instead of
preserving programmatic incentives for high levels of activity (like floors), or eliminating them
(like caps), a maximum fraction preserves them, but at a reduced level. This limit’s effects on
excess burden and distribution are comparably moderate. A maximum fraction does not
encourage bunching or spreading, or alter effective marginal rates in the way that an incomebased floor or caps does. Although a maximum fraction targets only high-income taxpayers
(e.g., above the 28% bracket in the Obama proposal), it does not eliminate their subsidy (as
phaseouts do). Likewise, this limit mitigates the “upside down” effect, but does not eliminate
it.161
Table 6: Maximum Fraction
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Valuable Externalities
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Diminishing Returns
Benefits for Essential First Dollar
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants
Excess Burden
Increased Complexity
Increased Cost for Favored Activity
Bracket Creep
Disguised Rate Increase
Spreading
Bunching
Distribution
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income
3rd Parties

Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

G. Haircuts
161

In a simulation, Toder, Rosenberg and Eng raise $82 billion with a 19.2% rate-based fraction, concluding that
89% of the impact is on the top 20%, and 41.4% is on the top 1%: this is significantly more progressive than a
haircut and an income-based limit, but less progressive than a fixed-dollar limit.
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Finally, instead of setting a maximum tax benefit for a favored expense (e.g., 28 cents per
dollar), we can disallow a fixed percentage of it. Under current law, for instance, only 50% of
business-related entertainment expenses can be deducted. A similar “haircut” can be applied to
any deduction, exclusion, or credit. For example, we can exclude only 50% of health insurance
premiums funded by employers.162
1. Programmatic Incentives
Like maximum fractions, haircuts weaken programmatic incentives, but do not eliminate
them. A haircut is useful, then, when the marginal reimbursement rate would otherwise be too
high. This can be true when claimants are especially responsive, so a lower subsidy still offers
sufficient motivation. In addition, a subsidy generally should equal the marginal positive
externalities it generates. If another dollar of mortgage interest generates only ten cents of
positive externalities, the marginal subsidy should be 10%. A haircut can bring us closer to this
optimal level.
It would be cleaner, though, to use a credit that specifies the rate we want. With this
approach, we do not need a haircut. After all, if we want the subsidy to be 20%, we can simply
use a 20% credit, instead of a 40% credit with a 50% haircut. In contrast, with deductions and
exclusions, a uniform haircut generates a different reimbursement rate in each bracket. For
example, a 50% haircut creates a 17.5% reimbursement rate in the 35% bracket, but only a 7.5%
reimbursement rate in the 15% bracket. Just as the marginal tax rates themselves are unlikely to
be optimal for a given subsidy, fractions of these rates also are unlikely to be optimal. To get
the right reimbursement rate in one bracket, we need a haircut that could yield the wrong rate in
another bracket. In theory, we could use different haircuts in different brackets but, again, it is
more straightforward to use a credit with the rate schedule we want.
Haircuts have another limitation as well: they offer the same subsidy for low and high
activity levels. In this way, haircuts resemble maximum fractions and differ starkly from caps
and floors. As a result, haircuts risk subsidizing what claimants would do anyway (e.g., the first
dollar of charity), or funding high levels of activity that yield fewer marginal externalities (e.g.,
gold-plated health insurance).
2.

Excess Burden

This difference between haircuts, on one hand, and caps and floors, on the other, means
these limits affect excess burden in different ways as well. For example, income-based caps
authorize more deductions as claimants earn more. Yet haircuts do not reduce the effective
marginal tax rate in this way. By earning more, a claimant cannot somehow turn a 50% haircut
into a 30% haircut.
If anything, haircuts become a tighter constraint as claimants earn more. Since
deductions and exclusions offer more generous tax benefits in higher brackets, the tax benefit
disallowed by a haircut becomes more valuable as claimants earn more. For example, losing
162

The alternative minimum tax also is a haircut of sorts, although the fraction disallowed varies with a number of
factors, including the AMT and regular marginal tax rates, as well the amount of tax preferences the taxpayer has.
For a discussion, see Hines & Logue, supra note 3.
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50% of the mortgage interest deduction costs more in the 39.6% bracket than in the 15% bracket
(19.8 cents versus 7.5 cents per dollar).
In imposing a heavier burden on high income claimants, then, haircuts are more like
income-based floors, which disallow more deductions as claimants earn more. Yet floors and
haircuts are by no means the same. While haircuts become more burdensome as taxpayers move
to a higher bracket, they accord the same treatment to claimants in the same bracket. Incomebased floors, by contrast, differentiate even among claimants in the same bracket. For example,
assume a claimant in the top bracket (earning $500,000) contributes $50,000 to charity, and is
subject either to a 10% haircut or a 1% floor. Each limit would disallow $5,000 of charitable
deductions, raising the tax bill by $1,980. But what happens if the claimant earns an additional
$1,000? The income-based floor would disallow another $10 of deductions, raising tax by $3.96.
In contrast, nothing changes with the haircut, which still disallows $5,000 of deductions. Like
maximum fractions, then, haircuts do not change the effective marginal rate in this way.
Similarly, haircuts do not encourage “bunching” or “spreading” in the same way that
floors and caps do. A haircut disallows the same percentage of deductions, whether they are
concentrated in a single year or spread across multiple years. Unlike with a floor (or cap), this
percentage cannot be reduced by concentrating (or spreading) deductions. In the example above,
the claimant can reduce the percentage of deductions she loses under the 1% floor – from 10% to
5% -- by contributing $100,000 in a single year, instead of $50,000 this year and $50,000 next
year.163 Yet under the 10% haircut, she loses 10% either way.164
Notwithstanding these differences, haircuts share three effects on excess burden with all
the limits discussed so far. First, like these other limits, a haircut can increase the after-tax cost
of favored activity, thereby influencing work and savings choices.165 Second, in disallowing a
portion of a claimant’s deductions or exclusions, a haircut can move claimants into a higher tax
bracket.166 (Limits on credits do not have this effect, as discussed above.) Third, any limit can
complicate the calculation of tax liability, although tax preparation software alleviates this
concern.
163

If she contributes $50,000 each year, she loses 1% of her income (or $5,000) in both years, for a total of $10,000.
But if she contributes $100,000 in one year, she loses only $5000 in that year, and 0 in the next year.
164
She either loses $10,000 in a single year (on the $100,000 contribution), or $5000 each year (on the two $50,000
contributions). As noted above, bunching can have the disadvantage of bringing a taxpayer into a lower bracket, so
the value of the deduction is reduced. This effect, which is different from the one described in the text, endures
under a haircut, but in somewhat diminished form (since the haircut reduces the deduction’s value anyway).
165
For example, if someone wants to use their last dollar of earnings to pay mortgage interest, but a maximum
fraction reduces the tax benefit, the purchasing power of this marginal dollar of earnings – and thus the return to
working more – is reduced. See supra Part II.C.1.b.
166
Taxpayers have to determine their tax bracket based on their income before they subtract their itemized
deductions (i.e., using adjusted gross income instead of taxable income). For example, since the 33% bracket
applies to income above $183,250, consider a taxpayer who has an adjusted gross income (“AGI”) of exactly this
$183,250 amount, and also has $10,000 of itemized deductions. Under current law, an additional dollar of earnings
is still taxed at 28%. The reason is that brackets are not applied to AGI (the pre-deduction amount), but to taxable
income (i.e., AGI minus itemized deductions). This means deductions can keep taxpayers from moving up to the
33% bracket: AGI is 183,251, but taxable income (i.e., AGI minus $10,000 of itemized deductions) is only
$173,251. As a result, a dollar of deductions is reducing tax by 33 cents – something that President Obama’s
proposal does not allow. Instead of applying the brackets after subtracting deductions, we would apply the brackets
to AGI, calculate the tax, and then separately subtract an amount equal to 28% of the itemized deductions (28% of
10,000 or 2800).
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3. Distribution
Unlike maximum fractions, which focus on higher brackets, haircuts apply to all
brackets. They differ from maximum fractions, then, in reducing tax benefits claimed by lowincome claimants. Even so, a haircut has more impact on high-bracket claimants, since their
deductions and exclusions – and, therefore, the fraction disallowed by a haircut – are worth
more. For example, a 50% haircut on a dollar of deductions costs 17.5 cents in the 35% bracket
but only 14 cents in the 28% bracket. Thus, although a haircut preserves the so-called “upside
down” effect – since tax benefits still correlate with the marginal tax rate – it burdens highincome claimants more for the same reason.
Again, the distributional analysis becomes more complicated if we focus on economic
benefits, instead of tax benefits. Like maximum fractions, haircuts cut the marginal
reimbursement rate. This can lower the level of favored activity, which (in some cases) will
eliminate externalities benefitting low-income people.
4. Tradeoffs
Like maximum fractions, haircuts also carve out a middle position between floors and
caps. They reduce programmatic incentives without eliminating them. In addition, haircuts do
not encourage “bunching” or “spreading,” or affect the marginal tax rate, in the way incomebased floors and caps do. Unlike maximum fractions, though, haircuts apply to all brackets.
Even so, the deductions and exclusions they partially disallow are worth more in higher
brackets.167
Table 7: Haircuts
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Valuable Externalities
Benefits for High Activity Levels With
Diminishing Returns
Benefits for Essential First Dollar
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants
Excess Burden
Increased Complexity
Increased Cost for Favored Activity
Bracket Creep
Disguised Rate Increase
Spreading

Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes (in a sense)168
No

167

Toder, Rosenberg and Eng raise $82 billion with a 29.5% haircut, and find that 71.7% of the impact is on the top
20% (compared with 67.1% for an income-based cap and 90.8% for a fixed dollar cap). They estimate that 24.9%
comes from the top 1% (compared with 22.1% for an income-based cap and 60.4% for a fixed dollar cap).
168
By earning more, and thus moving to a higher bracket, a claimant loses a portion of a more valuable deduction,
as noted above. Yet unlike income-based floors and phaseouts, haircuts do not increase the effective marginal rate
of claimants who stay in the same bracket.
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Bunching
Distribution
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income
3rd Parties
IV.

No
Yes
No
Yes

Implications: “Grand Slam” Opportunities, Tradeoffs, and the Value of
Context-Specific Tailoring
A. Grand Slam Opportunities

In some cases, when we limit a tax expenditure, all our goals align. We can save money
while preserving programmatic benefits, mitigating excess burden, and enhancing distribution.
This Article identifies two circumstances in which these “grand slam” situations arise. In the
first, programmatic benefits are not worth preserving. This can be true if a tax expenditure
pursues unwise goals or, for that matter, if it pursues valuable goals ineffectively.
In the second “grand slam” scenario, programmatic benefits are valuable, but only at low
activity levels. Depending on the relevant empirics, subsidized health insurance, retirement
savings, and mortgage interest could all involve declining marginal externalities, as discussed
above. If this is the case, caps can saves money while largely preserving programmatic benefits.
Admittedly, caps can add to compliance costs and also can increase effective marginal tax rates
in some ways (e.g., bracket creep). But unlike phaseouts and income-based floors, caps are not
mathematically equivalent to a rate increase; on the contrary, income based-caps reduce effective
marginal tax rates. Caps also improve distribution if they disproportionately burden high-income
taxpayers. This may be true of caps on health insurance, retirement savings, and mortgage
interest, as discussed above. After all, high-income claimants disproportionately claim these tax
expenditures, although in some cases low-income people also benefit from externalities
generated by these tax expenditures. In any event, when a tax expenditure satisfies these various
empirical parameters, capping it can save revenue, enhance progressivity, and preserve valuable
externalities, while adding only modestly to excess burden.
B. Tradeoffs and the Value of Context-Specific Tailoring
Yet in other cases, there is tension among our competing goals. As Part III showed,
various limits strike different balances among programmatic benefits, excess burden, and
distribution. The table below summarizes the diverse effects of the seven limits analyzed in Part
III.
All of these limits have four common effects: first, they raise revenue; second, they
increase the after-tax cost of the favored activity; third, they can move a claimant into a higher
tax bracket; fourth, they add complexity to the tax system by introducing another rule that must
be understood and enforced, although some of these limits can also have the offsetting effect of
simplifying the law (e.g., as floors do in eliminating the need for record-keeping).
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Yet despite these commonalities, these limits are quite different. Some affect
programmatic benefits by eliminating the subsidy for high activity levels (fixed-dollar caps and
income-based caps). In contrast, other limits do not change the subsidy for high activity levels
(fixed-dollar floors and income-based floors), and still others preserve it in weakened form
(maximum fractions and haircuts). Likewise, some limits withhold the subsidy for the first
dollar of activity (e.g., income-based floors and fixed-dollar floors), but others maintain it (fixeddollar caps and income based caps). Again, others weaken but do not eliminate it (maximum
fractions and haircuts). As a result, these various limits allow us to fine tune programmatic
incentive, inducing the desired effects more cost-effectively. At the same time, if the incentive is
too nuanced or complex – so it becomes incomprehensible – it cannot motivate claimants
effectively.
These limits also affect excess burden in different ways. Some are mathematically
equivalent to a cut in the marginal tax rate (income-based caps), or to an increase in the marginal
tax rate (income-based floors, phaseouts, and arguably haircuts as well); in contrast, others do
not influence the effective marginal tax rate in this way (fixed-dollar caps, fixed-dollar floors,
and maximum fractions). Some limits encourage bunching (income-based floors and fixed
dollar floors) or spreading (income-based caps and fixed dollar caps), and others do not have
either of these effects (phaseouts, maximum fractions, and haircuts).
Needless to say, these limits also affect distribution in different ways. Some deny the
subsidy to high-income claimants (phaseouts) or otherwise disproportionately reduce their tax
benefits (fixed dollar caps, maximum fractions, and haircuts), while others do not (income-based
floors, fixed-dollar floors, and income-based caps).
Table 8: The Diverse Effects of Seven Different Limits

Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for High
Activity Levels With
Valuable Externalities
Benefits for High
Activity Levels With
Diminishing Returns
Benefits for Essential
First Dollar
Benefits for Inframarginal First Dollar
Benefits for Responsive
Wealthy Claimants
Benefits for Inframarginal Wealthy
Claimants
Excess Burden
Increased Complexity
Increased Cost for
Favored Activity
Bracket Creep

FixedDollar
Floors

IncomeBased
Floors

FixedDollar
Caps

IncomeBased
Caps

Phaseouts
and Cliffs

Maximum
Fractions

Haircuts

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes (in
theory)

Yes (but
reduced)

Yes (but
reduced)

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes (in
theory)

Yes (but
reduced)

Yes (but
reduced)

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes (but
reduced)
Yes (but
reduced)
Yes (but
reduced)
Yes (but
reduced)

Yes (but
reduced)
Yes (but
reduced)
Yes (but
reduced)
Yes (but
reduced)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Disguised Rate Increase

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Spreading
Bunching

No
Yes

No
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
No

No
No

No
No

Yes (in a
sense)
No
No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes (but
reduced)

Yes (but
reduced)

Distribution
Disproportionate Cuts
for Wealthy Claimants
Mitigated “Upside
Down” Effect
Cost-Effective
Externalities for LowIncome 3rd Parties

Since each limit involves a different mix of tradeoffs, we should pick the limit (or
combination of limits) that is the best fit for a particular tax expenditure. For example, a
phaseout has the advantage of focusing a subsidy on those who most need it, but the
disadvantage of raising effective marginal rates. This balance of benefits and costs is more
plausible for subsidies that generate private benefits, such as the EITC. It is less appealing for
subsidies that generate externalities for low-income claimants, such as charity for soup kitchens.
Likewise, a well-crafted floor on the charitable deduction can save money while (largely)
preserving incentives to give. Yet floors also trigger welfare costs. Since the mix of costs varies
for different floors, we need to pick our poison. For example, a fixed-dollar floor has the
disadvantage of not adjusting to a claimant’s giving capacity. But it has the offsetting advantage
of not raising the effective marginal rate in the way income-based floors do. Likewise, if we set
the floor at a low level, we save less money and subsidize more infra-marginal contributions.
But a higher floor triggers more bunching. High floors also keep us from motivating donors
whose marginal contributions would be below the floor. We need to weigh these competing
effects in order to choose the right limit.
As these examples illustrate, we should tailor each limit to the context, since every tax
expenditure involves a different mix of externalities and elasticities. For similar reasons, we may
also want a different marginal reimbursement rate for each tax expenditure. While
administrative and information costs limit how much tailoring we can do, the right number is
unlikely to be the marginal tax rate,169 as discussed above.170
In setting marginal reimbursement rates, and also in crafting limits, we also should
remember that the relevant facts can change. Over the past thirty years, for example, many tax
169

See Saez, supra note 12, at 2659 (“There is no theoretical reason to link the subsidy rate on the contribution good
to the income tax rate as is currently done in the US income tax code.”). Batchelder, Goldberg, Orszag, supra note
8, at 28 (“It is extremely unlikely that externalities and elasticities change in an abrupt and discontinuous fashion
exactly at the point of zero income tax liability or the marginal tax rate thresholds.”).
170
Admittedly, there might be some correlation. For instance, tax sensitive people may be more responsive not only
in their labor supply decisions, but also in their use of tax expenditures. Cf. Joel Slemrod & Wojciech Kopczuk, The
Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income 84 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (2002) (positing that elasticity may be controllable
instead of a pure preference). If all else were equal, then, we would want lower rates – both tax rates and subsidy
rates – for those who are especially tax sensitive. Yet even for them, we should be concerned that elasticities of
labor supply differ from those for subsidized activities, such that the rates should be different.

57

expenditures have stopped providing tax benefits to middle- and low-income claimants; the
reason, noted above, is that marginal tax rates have been cut so substantially. Like distributional
impact, other key variables can change as well, such as programmatic benefits and administrative
costs. When the essential facts change, we may also need to adjust the limit or the marginal
reimbursement rate (or both). We have reason, then, to reevaluate these issues periodically.
C. Basket Limits
The value of context-specific tailoring has another implication: we should be skeptical of
basket limits. Although they may be good politics, as discussed above, they are not usually good
policy.171 The problem is that baskets are clumsy way to calibrate the level of favored activity.
To see why, assume a subsidy of X induces the optimal level of health insurance, while Y induces
the optimal level of retirement savings. What happens if we set a single basket limit, X + Y, for
these two activities combined? A taxpayer can spend all of X & Y on health insurance and
nothing on retirement savings, or vice versa.
Given the blunt incentives they create, basket limits are not easy to justify (setting
politics aside). One potential rationale is that they allow taxpayers to choose the tax
expenditures they value the most. Yet choice is counterproductive if it undercuts the purpose of
the limit. For example, if we do not want to subsidize the first dollar of charity, a floor that can
be met with other deductions does not keep the first charitable dollar from being subsidized.172
Alternatively, the advantage of basket limits may be that claimants are less likely to
notice them. If so, the government may be able to change behavior on the cheap, inducing
favored activity without actually paying for it. Yet claimants presumably will notice eventually;
they could be tipped off, for example, by advisors, media coverage, or unexpectedly high tax
bills. When they realize their error, claimants could start worrying about hidden traps in other
subsidies (even when there are none). This erosion of trust could make it harder, and more
expensive, to motivate them again.
Finally, the case for basket limits may lie in administrative savings. With baskets, we
avoid the cost of crafting multiple limits, and of policing the lines among different tax
expenditures. Even so, it does not seem especially difficult to craft a separate limit for each tax
expenditure, or to determine whether a payment is mortgage interest instead of charity.173 At the
same time, any administrative savings we reap comes at a cost: baskets can warp the relevant
incentives, as noted above. As a result, it seems unlikely that the administrative savings from
baskets routinely offsets the programmatic costs of having blunter incentives. Yet like so many
issues in this Article, this is an empirical question that should be resolved with context-specific
analysis.
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Toder, Rosenberg, Eng, supra note 21, at 5 (“across the board limits on spending . . . may make it politically
easier to sustain spending cuts. Overall limits on spending or tax expenditures are suboptimal ways to reduce
deficits because they equally cut high-value and low-value activities. No well-functioning organization, either
private or governmental, would reduce its costs in this manner.” “And if tax expenditures more often than not
misallocate resources, overall limits on them could yield net improvement in the tax system and budgetary policy,
even while falling far short of the ideal.”).
172
For example, the Pease rule’s 3% floor can be met with state income taxes.
173
Kaplow, Standard Deduction, supra note 117, at 28 (noting that policing the lines among tax expenditures is not
difficult).
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D. Empirical Research
Needless to say, the centrality of empirical questions is a recurring theme in this Article.
Since empirical research on the right questions can add a lot of value, the Treasury should devote
more resources to this research. It also should provide more data to academic partners, and can
consider grants and other support as well.
E. Should Benefits Vary By Income? A Response to Batchelder, Goldberg and
Orszag
The importance of context has still another implication: when externalities and elasticity
vary systematically with income, the marginal reimbursement rate should vary as well.
However, Lily Batchelder, Fred Goldberg and Peter Orszag resist this sort of income-based
tailoring, at least as a general matter. Instead, they recommend using refundable credits as a
default practice, so the same marginal reimbursement rate applies to everyone.174 They accept
income-based variation only based on “specific knowledge that [high income] households are
more responsive to the incentive or that engaging in the behavior generates larger social
benefits”175 But this is the exception, not the rule. In defending uniformity as a default, they
ground their argument in efficiency. They claim that uniformity minimizes the risk of large
errors, and thus reduces distortions, which are a function of the square of errors.176
Default rules are more appealing, though, if they are correct most of the time. As a
result, a key question is how often elasticities and externalities vary with income. Batchelder,
Goldberg and Orszag’s proposal is more compelling if these variations are rare. Yet there are
many reasons why these variables often would vary with income. For example, if the goal of a
subsidy is to provide private benefits, subsidizing low-income claimants usually is preferable.
The same is true if the goal is to encourage self-sufficiency, for instance, by encouraging
claimants to enter the workforce, buy health insurance, or save for retirement. Since highincome claimants are likely to take these steps on their own, more externalities are generated in
focusing on low-income claimants. In contrast, instead of targeting those who are most in need,
we sometimes target those who are most responsive. In these cases, we have reason to focus on
high-income claimants. Whether these scenarios are typical or unusual is, of course, an
empirical question. This Articles does not seek to resolve it definitively. Yet there certainly are
a number of contexts were externalities and elasticities do vary with income.
Even so, Batchelder, Goldberg and Orszag offer another argument for uniformity: even if
elasticity and externalities do vary with income, uniformity is better if we are unsure how they
vary. Nevertheless, this argument is persuasive only if we have no idea whether to subsidize
low- or high-income claimants. Batchelder, Goldberg and Orszag rely on just such an example.
They assume a ten cent subsidy should be given either to a high-income group (H) or a lowincome group (L), and we have no sense of which is more likely. On these facts, Batchelder,
Goldberg and Orszag show that giving five cents to each group (a certain error of five each time)
minimizes deadweight loss: five cents, after all, is the mean of the possible outcomes (i.e., ten or
174

Batchelder, Goldberg &Orszag, supra note 8, at 27 n.16(the “default assumption” should be that “underlying
price elasticities and behavior do not vary systematically across income distribution”).
175
Id. at 24.
176
Batchelder, Goldberg and Orszag ground their case in efficiency, rather than in distribution. See generally
Batchelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 8, at 47-48.

59

zero).177 But the key assumption in their example – the reason why uniformity is the errorminimizing default – is that H and L are equally plausible.
However, this analysis no longer holds when we have at least some sense of which
income cohort should be funded. In this case, uniformity no longer minimizes distortions. For
instance, assume L should get more of the subsidy, but we don’t know how much more. There is
a 50% chance that 75% should go to L and 25% should go to H. There also is a 50% chance that
all should go to L. On these facts, uniformity (5 and 5) does not minimize errors178 or
deadweight loss.179 Instead, it is better to split the difference between the most likely scenarios
(8.75 and 1.25).180 Accordingly, when we are able to make even a rough guess, the default
should not be uniformity, but context-specific tailoring. If externalities and elasticity might vary
with income, but we are not sure how, we should use our best estimate of the relevant facts. A
probability-weighted mean of likely outcomes minimizes the square of deviations.181
Admittedly, this “best estimate” approach is not helpful if the relevant elasticities and
externalities are a complete mystery. If even a ballpark estimate is impossible, Batchelder,
Goldberg, and Orszag’s argument for uniformity has force. But if we truly have no idea, does a
subsidy really make sense? Before committing scarce resources, we should have at least a rough
prediction of a subsidy’s effects. Otherwise, how can conclude that it is cost-justified? Once
this sort of prediction is feasible, uniformity is no longer the efficient answer.182
Of course, there may be other reasons to favor uniformity, such as a social welfare
function that especially values equal treatment in the relevant setting. But if we seek to promote
equality more generally – whether to reduce income inequality or to promote economic mobility
– we often should vary the subsidy by income. For example, if a subsidy’s goal is to provide
private benefits (e.g., EITC), it usually should favor low-income claimants. In contrast, a
subsidy that seeks to generate positive externalities for low-income people (e.g., charity for soup
kitchens) should focus on high-income claimants if they are more responsive. Ultimately, when
we decide whether the marginal reimbursement rate of a tax expenditure should vary with
177

As a result, this five cent error for all minimizes the square of deviations (and thus deadweight loss) at twentyfive. (The deadweight loss is the square of the errors, or 1/2(5*5) +1/2(5*5) =25.) By contrast, if we give the full
subsidy to one group, we have a 50% chance of being right and a 50% chance of an error of ten, which generates
twice as much deadweight loss (i.e., 50). (Deadweight loss = ½ (10*10) + ½ (0*0) = 50.) See Batchelder, Goldberg
& Orszag, supra note 8, at 48 (“Although the expected error would be the same irrespective of whether the entire
subsidy was given to one group or spread evenly over both groups, the expected deadweight loss would be
minimized by a uniform subsidy because the loss from failing to correct for a positive externality rises with the
square of the uncorrected externality.”).
178
Expected error is 3.75, based on the following: ¼(5) +1/4(5) +1/4(2.5) +.1/4(2.5)=3.75. (Note that this analysis
deems both overpayment and underpayment to be an error.)
179
Expected deadweight loss is 15.625: 1/2(5*5) + 1/2(2.5*2.5) =15.625.
180
Expected error falls to 2.5: 1/2(2.5) +1/2(2.5) =2.5. Expected deadweight loss falls to 6.25: ½(2.5)*(2.5)
+1/2(2.5)(2.5) = 6.25.
181
Cf. Kaplow, Standard Deduction, supra note 117, at 14 n. 38 (“It is a familiar statistical property that the mean
minimizes the sum of the squares of deviations.”).
182
Another potential problem with subsidies that vary by income is that they promote clientele effects. Those who
receive more generous subsidies might outbid others who otherwise value the asset more. Shaviro, Bucket &
Buffett, supra note 20, at 8. Yet such bidding seems more plausible for some assets (e.g., municipal bonds) than
others (e.g., houses). After all, a bidding war for a house between taxpayers in the 20% and 40% bracket seems
improbable. If it happens, the difference in income is likely to overwhelm any differences in tax treatment. Even
so, clientele effects can distort the allocation of at least some assets.
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income, we need to account for all the issues in this Article’s framework. The point here is
merely that we need a context-specific analysis, instead of assuming uniformity is the answer.
V.

Conclusion

To sum up, then, this Article offers a three-part framework for deciding whether to repeal
or limit a tax expenditure. First, what programmatic benefits would we lose? What positive
externalities are created, and how much would we have without the subsidy? Can we tighten up
the tax expenditure to get all (or most) of the benefits at a lower cost? Second, do we incur an
offsetting welfare cost by increasing excess burden? What are the effects on labor and savings
decisions, administrative costs, and planning? Third, do we incur an offsetting cost in
distribution? Who is claiming the tax benefit? What is the economic incidence of this benefit?
This Article shows that repeal or a limit can sometimes enhance all of our goals. These
“grand slam” opportunities can arise, for instance, when we can repeal a tax expenditure that
offers only meager programmatic benefits, and also when we cap a tax expenditure whose
marginal programmatic benefits decline significantly as an individual engages in more of the
favored activity.
In other settings, the elements of this Article’s framework are often in tension with each
other. Steps to preserve programmatic incentives, for example, might increase excess burden or
undercut distributional goals (or both). This Article also shows that various limits balance these
tradeoffs in different ways. Income-based caps have essentially the opposite effects as incomebased floors, while maximum fractions are a compromise between the two. We should choose
the tradeoff that yields the most favorable balance of benefits and costs in a particular context.
Given these nuances, it is important to tailor limits to the context. This is less feasible for
limits that apply to baskets, instead of expenditure-specific limits. For similar reasons, this
Article counsels against tax expenditures that are uniform at all income levels, since externalities
and elasticity are likely to vary with income.
The bottom line, then, is that limits need to be fine-tuned to account for externalities,
elasticity, administrative costs, labor and savings decisions, planning and distribution.
Admittedly, the relevant facts will not always be known, at least with certainty. We will have to
make the best judgments we can with limited information. Although the results will not be
perfect, we should be able to improve on current law.
A key question, of course, is whether we have the political will to repeal or limit tax
expenditures that are not cost-justified. These tax expenditures are jealously guarded by interest
groups, who will resist repeal or limits in predictable ways. In ordinary fiscal conditions, their
higher stakes would give them a formidable political edge. But these are somewhat unusual
times. Our soaring national debt and anemic economic growth, sobering as they are, may offer
an opportunity. These challenges can focus popular attention on what otherwise would be
obscure debates. This higher profile is crucial in repealing or limiting a tax expenditure that is
not cost-justified. Voters who have no direct stake in it must become a political counterweight to
those who do. These seemingly unaffected voters must come to recognize that the alternatives to
repealing or limiting someone else’s sacred cow – such as marginal rate increases, spending cuts,
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or more deficit spending – will, in fact, burden them. This insight could motivate the uninvolved
to become involved. While it is too optimistic to consider this outcome inevitable, it is too
pessimistic to rule it out. If it happens, we should not let the opportunity go to waste.
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Appendix183
Tax Expenditure

FY 2014 Cost (Billions)

Business Investments
Dividends and Long-Term Capital Gains

96.5184

Domestic Production Expenses

16.8185

Expensing Depreciable Business Property (Sec. 179)

7.0186

Research Activities Credit (Sec. 41)

5.5187

Research and Experimental Expenditures Deduction

4.7188

Charity
Charitable Contributions Other than for Education and Health Care

35.8189

Charitable Contributions for Education

6.3190

Charitable Contributions for Health Care

4.8191

Education
Employer-Provided Education Assistance and Tuition Reduction

183

1.5192

In general, these estimates come from Jt. Com. on Tax’n, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years
2014–18 (2014) (Table 1) (hereinafter “Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates”) (offering tax expenditure
estimates by budget function). In some cases, the number represents the sum of both the corporate and personal
income tax revenue.
184
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 27.
185
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 27 ($12.2 billion for corporations plus $4.6 billion for
individuals).
186
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 26 ($2.5 billion for corporations plus $4.5 billion for
individuals).
187
Jt. Com. on Tax’n, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2012–17, at 30 (2013) ($5.4 billion
for corporations and $.1 billion for individuals estimated for 2014). Since this credit expired on December 31, 2014,
the Joint Committee did not include it in its 2014 estimate. Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 10.
But it has expired before and been extended, and many expect it to be offered again in 2014. Committee for a
Responsible Federal Budget, Ways and Means Considers Extending Business Tax Breaks, Apr. 28, 2014,
http://crfb.org/blogs/ways-means-considers-extending-business-tax-breaks.
188
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 23 ($4.6 billion for corporations plus $.1 billion for
individuals).
189
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31 ($1.0 billion for corporations plus $34.8 billion for
individuals).
190
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29 ($.3 billion for corporations plus $6.0 billion for
individuals).
191
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31 ($1.8 billion for corporations plus $3.0 billion for
individuals).
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Parental Personal Exemption for Students Aged 19-23

4.7193

Post-Secondary Education Tuition Credit

23.0194

Savings Exclusions and Coverdell

.1195

Scholarship and Fellowship Income Exclusion

2.6196

Student Loan Interest

1.7197

Employment
Cafeteria Plan Benefits

34.5198

Miscellaneous Fringe Benefits

7.3199

Meals and Lodging

2.0200

Green Energy
Energy Credit and Renewable Electricity Production

1.8201

Energy Efficient Improvements to Residential Property

1.8202

Plug-in Hybrids

0.2203

Health Care
Employer-provided Health Insurance Exclusion

143204

Health Savings Accounts

1.6205

Medical Expenses and Long-Term Care Deduction

9.9206

192

Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29. ($1.2 billion for employer-provided education assistance
and $.3 billion for tuition reductions).
193
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29.
194
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30.
195
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29.
196
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29.
197
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29.
198
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30.
199
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30.
200
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30.
201
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 23 ($.5 billion for corporations and $.1 billion for individuals
for energy credit; $1.1 billion for corporations and $.1 billion for renewable energy production).
202
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 23 ($.6 billion for existing residential properties, $1.1 for
energy-efficient property credit and $.1 billion for advanced-energy property credit).
203
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 23.
204
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31.
205
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31.
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Medicare Benefits Exclusion

61207

Self-Employed Deduction

5.4208

Worker’s Compensation

4.8209

Small Business Credit

0.9210

Health Exchange Subsidies

15.5211

Housing
Low-Income Housing

7.1212

Home Mortgage Interest

67.8213

Exclusion of Capital Gains on Principal Residence

24.1214

Property Taxes

31.9215

Retirement Savings
IRA’s

17.9216

Pension Contributions Exclusion

76.7217

Social Security and Railroad Benefits Exclusion

37.4218

Social Services and Income Support
57.3219

Child Credit
206

Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31.
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32. ($31.8 billion for hospital insurance, $22.7 billion for
supplementary medical insurance and $6.5 billion for prescription drug insurance).
208
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31.
209
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31.
210
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31 ($.1 billion for corporations and $.8 billion for
individuals).
211
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31.
212
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 26 ($6.8 billion for corporations and $.3 billion for
individuals).
213
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 25.
214
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 26.
215
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 25.
216
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32. ($11.8 billion for traditional IRAs and $4.9 billion for
Roth IRAs and $1.2 billion for elective deferrals).
217
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32. ($5.8 billion for Keogh plans, $26 billion for defined
benefit plans, and $44.9 billion for defined contribution plans).
218
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 33.
219
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30.
207
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Child and Dependent Care

4.6220

Disability and Public Assistance Benefits Exclusion

3.4221

EITC

69.2222

State and Local Governments
Municipal Bond Interest Exclusion (General Bonds)

33.1223

State and Local (Nonbusiness) Income Taxes

56.5224

Transportation
4.9225

Employer-Paid Transportation Benefits

220

Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30.
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32.
222
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32.
223
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 33.
224
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 33.
225
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 28.
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